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Abstract
This report is a general review of the Boston Housing
Authority's management initiatives during the period of 1980
through 1984, the first four years of its court
receivership. The Authority was placed in receivership
because of its inability to remedy its substandard housing
conditions.
During that time, the BHA made some notable strides in
restoring its managment capacity. It embarked upon a new
decentralized management effort, increased the efficiency
and responsiveness of its central departments and began a
comprehensive capital improvements program.
There still ex ists,numerous housing code violations
throughout the Authority's properties and many are concerned
that the Authority, once out of receivership, will no longer
be capable of its present day, intensive renewal efforts.
Fortunately, these four years of court receivership
have served the Authority well. With the continued diligence
of BHA's staff and residents, there is little doubt that the
the Boston Housing Authority is headed for long term
recovery.
As the Authority enters post-receivership, its
governing structure and operating practices must not only
ensure that the BHA fulfill its mandate to provide safe,
decent and sanitary low-rent housing but in so doing,
empower tenants to impact the actions of the Authority and
other institutions whose services and support shape the
lives of public housing families.
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Introduction
The Boston Housing Authority, (BHA), was established
in 1935 to take advantage of federal aid in the construction
of low rent public housing. According to the Commonwealth's
enabling statue, (MGL 121 B), Boston's housing authority was
to provide safe, sanitary and decent housing to families or
elderly persons of low income. Subsequent state legislation
also provided public housing authorities with the ability to
lease units in the private sector for low income renters.
Since its formation, the Authority has become the fourth
largest public housing agency in the nation, managing over
17,000 units of family and elderly housing and leasing
another 5,600 apartments from private owners.
Of Boston's 200 ,000 low or moderate income residents,
nearly one fourth of those persons, or 55,000, live in BHA a
operated unit, accounting for nearly one tenth of Boston's
entire rental inventory. From 1970 to 1980, the city wide
vacancy rate dropped from 7% to its current rate of 2%.(1)
Located in fifteen neighborhoods of Boston, today, the BHA
manages 31 family developments, 38 elderly projects and
operates one community residence, in addition to its
extensive leased housing program.
What Hapend?
After nearly a decade of legal controversy centering
on the Authority's failtures as a housing agency, Boston's
public housing residents and their attorneys success-fully
persuaded the Massachusetts Superior Court to remove BHA
from the goverance of its quasi-public Board and to
consolidate the powers of goverance and administration under
the auspices of a court appointed Receiver. By placing the
Boston Housing Authority in court receivership, the judge
concluded that without his unfettered control over the
administration and operations of the BHA, the numerous
substandard conditions found in public housing could not, in
good faith, be substantively addressed.
Historically, Boston's public housing program had been
controlled by the city's ruling political interests. Jobs,
housing and votes were important brokering chips for which
city politicans openly vied. Back when Boston's program
first began, public housing communities were for the working
poor only. And for white families only. And for the
politically connected, only.
During its first twenty years of operations, the city
of Boston received important benefits from its public
housing program. The physical plants were relatively modern,
social order was resolutely maintained by a strong,
authoritative and powerful manager and the city s
politicians expressed a vested interest in BHA's efficient
operation. Everyone seemed to agree that a locally governed
and controlled, public housing program, financed with
federal construction and mortgage monies, was a well
conceived arrangement. For the city, it seemed that there
was little to lose and much to gain from a thriving public
housing agency.
Then, in the short span of a barely more than a
decade, the bottom fell out, leaving one of the city's most
powerful institutions in a state of advancing paralysis. The
time was the sixties and Boston, as was the nation, was in
the throes of coping with changing attitudes towards the
poor, racial and ethnic groups and liberal political ideas.
Civil rights initiatives culminated in a tumultous
local experience centering around the desegregation of
Boston's public schools. Coalitions of community groups
rallied to stop urban renewal and highway construction plans
from leveling their neighborhoods. In 1963, a mayor, who
would ultimately run the city's seat of government for an
unprecedented sixteen years, was elected. These forces, in
combination with a variety of financial factors, would
ultimately lead to a political clash between Boston's
electoral leaders and public housing tenants.
By the 70's, after years of Great Society federal
programing, congressional housing policies began to shift
into a conservative direction. Efforts to pursuade Congress
to provide, then later, increase, sorely needed operating
subsidies to public housing authorities, (PHA's), were
limited successes. HUD programs continued to emphasize new
construction, and most PHA's, including Boston, limped along
with occassional modernization assistance.
Without the ongoing physical upkeep of BHA projects,
neighborhood relations grew strained. Some family
developments housed a majority of the neighborhood populace,
and had a large impact upon local business and residential
property values.
The seventies were a time when the Authority's tenant
population had uneven levels of registered voters--the
elderly were heavily registered, while many low income
groups were virtually 100% non-voters. When physical
distress combined with less political clout that in BHA's
early years, the results were poisonous. The Authority's
socio-economic health went rapidly downhill and BHA's i.
wide image as a blighting, crime ridden, unwjeIIco(med neigqhbr
began to unfold.
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before the Authority would be forced to revamp its
administrative and operating strategies. Through the powers
of court receivership, public housing officials and
residents hoped to begin the process of rebuilding BHA's
management program, to renew its social fabric and to
revitalize the Authority's fiscal infrastructure.
At the center of this effort is the Housing Manager.
According to BHA's Chief of Operations,
"the manager...becomes the key person, the focal point
around which the Authority... delivers its services and
fulfills its mandate. That tells you a whole lot... about how
the organization ought to be structured.. if the manager is
the focal point, then ... the manager ought to be responsible
for, and have a staff to carry out all of the day to day
work that has to be done... Our task at the BHA, has been to
take a management system, which was basically incapable of
delivering its services and make it capable of deliver(y)."
It is, perhaps, the efforts of the manager, that will serve
as the fundamental test of whether the Authority can
successfully restore its buildings and communities. Court
receivership is, a small incubated period of time, in which
those challenges can be assessed.
This once powerful housing entity, through
receivership, has begun the slow process of reconstructing
its crumbling management foundation. At the helm of the ship
is the Housing Manager whose role within the field
management system has been the gamut: from respected leader
and decision-maker to a relatively powerless office manager
that was often ill informed about the day to day operations
of the his or her local development.
What management model, be it private, tenant or BHA
provided, could successfully begin to breath new life into
public housing; especially their most distressed family
development projects? What were the opportunities which
court receivership could generate that would serve the long
and difficult process of providing decent, low rent housing
to the city's poor and moderate income peoples'?
CHAPTER I
BHA's Role in Boston's Housing Market
Local Benefits:
From the time the city of Boston passed enabling
legislation to charter the Boston Housing Authority, the
importance of low rent, decent housing, would become
increasingly apparent to the city fathers. Newly formed
households, returning veterans and their families and the
elderly turned to public housing, which was one of the few
shelter assistance programs that reached "down the income
scale" effectively. (2)
Local businesses and industries looked to public
housing communities for potential customers and employees.
Because early public housing advocates believed that low
rent housing should offer employment as well as housing
assistance to eligible families, public housing developments
were typically built, on inexpensive public lands, near
locally thriving centers of employment.
The city's dock areas such as in Charlestown,
Dorchester, South Boston and East Boston, for example, had
large family projects constructed in their neighborhoods.
Industrial and commerical sectors, (Dudley Station, Blue
Hill Avenue corridor, Allston-Brighton etc.)., became
appealing locations for family projects such as Orchard
Park:, Faneuil and Fidelis Way. Other sites such as
Cathedral, Bromley Heath and the Missions were located near
medical and educational institutions.
Local neighborhoods were glad to see the jobs from
construction, management and maintenance which accompanied
the Authority's expansion. The Authority's development
activities were locally controlled in order to more fully
assist the process of stimulating the local economy.
Prominent business and labor leaders, local realtors and
friends of city and state politicians, set policy as
Governing Board members appointed to five year terms by the
mayor or governor, (1 seat).
With the combination of federal construction monies and
local policy makers who understood their community's needs
and priorities, it seemed that Boston's public housing
agency would mal.k:e a significant contribution to the city's
economic growth.
Local Problems Shaping the Authority:
Local communities, of course, could not predict the
decade of economic decline which would grip the region in
the 1950's and 60's. Due to rising energy and labor costs,
an exodus of major employers such as the steel, textiles and
shoe industries began. Other industries such as shipping and
light manufacturing firms were impacted as well.
As a city, Boston serves as a center of commerce. When
the statewide economy began to shift, Boston lost many blue
collar jobs. City residents, including public housing wage
earners, were hit hard by the steady decline in blue collar
job opportunities and entire neighborhoods struggled to
overcome the effects of unemployment, business losses and
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the slow down of private investment activites.
It seemed at the same time that the employment sector
was undergoing periodical shocks and upheavals, the city's
housing market was also beginning to feel the strain of its
geographical limits. Land prices were rising and housing
production could not keep pace with the city's needs.
Boston's rigid racial and ethnic prejudices compounded
housing problems even more, preventing many citizens from
living, and sometimes working, in certain city areas.
By 1954, almost 99% of the Authority's existing
family units had been built and as BHA entered the sixties,
its family housing production came to a virtual standstill.
The city's overall vacancy rate was on the decline and
market rents, in general began to take a steep climb. Many
poor families could no longer afford to live in private
rental housing. Many large families, could not find, less
more afford, adequate housing.
BHA housing projects, lik.::e most poor communities were
vulnerable to the changing economic and political climate.
Politicans were the first to begin to react to the city's
changing employment market calling for new and innovative
economic strategies to alleviate the growing hardship which
local businesses and service groups were facing.
Urban renewal was crafted by legislators as a
comprehensive means for the nation's cities to prepare and
implement broad based economic revitalization efforts.
Boston was one of the nation's earliest applicants for urban
.1
renewal dollars and many of their early redevelopment
projects served as national models of public-private
initiatives.
City fathers made hard choices about who would benefit
from the resources of urban renewal and history has shown
that very few poor communities were beneficiaries.
Unfortunatel y, the city's public housing agency would not
only be excluded from the city's new found progress, it
would also become one of its foremost victims.
By the late sixties, next to HUD operated, foreclosed
properties, BHA was perhaps the city's biggest landlord. Its
founding mandate, to provide decent, low rent housing, was
being stretched by a new mandate: to serve as housing of the
last resort. Thousands of existing units had been demolished
to make way for new government, office and commercial uses.
Some subsidized housing was built in place of torn down
buildings, but the number of newly built houses, came no
where near the numbers of homes which were destroyed and
never replaced.
The Authority was already a haven for political
manipulation and abuse. Tenant selection was already shaped
by patronage and racism; jobs with the Authority typically
came by way of political connections and a tradition of
seeking career advancement by way of political sponsorship,
supplanted performance appraisals. There was gross.
inappropriate interference in BHA's day to day operations by
BHA Board members and like any "extended" city department,
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BHA officials could not ignore the demands of the mayor.
According to Ed Logue, the then director of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, (BRA), the architects of the city's
urban renewal program, literally, viewed the BHA as an
integral component of its relocation program. Despite the
obvious decline in the physical conditions of many BHA
developments, Boston's urban renewal efforts did not add to
the operational capacity of the Authority. "All we cared
about"., commented Logue at a forum held at MIT in 1983, "was
how many units we could get to move our development plans
forward and relocate those people." Ironically, while the
city rebuilt its downtown districts, it stoked the fires of
destruction that would ultimately claim its public housing
agency.
Housing Reformers Begin Work to Save the Authority:
When it became apparent that the BHA was entering into
an unprecedented period of operational decline, calls came for
centralized, top down, reforms in the delivery of BHA's
housing services. Management consultants, housing groups and
advocates joined with residents of public housing to protest
its deplorable conditions and city neglect.
Neighborhood delcine had taken its toll on area
services and employment sectors. Urban renewal relocation
had milked the Authority of its available units leaving
tremendous social controversy in its wake. Long time
residents of public housing resented the newcomers; most who
had not even shared a common neighborhood history. These
newcomers were different, perhaps less caring about local
issues; their presence in BHA units was not due to family
or political ties, but because the house they used to live
in, had been torn down.
In contrast, hundreds of new families felt stranded in
between the hopes and promises of returning to their former
homes and being "temporary" public housing residents.
Instead of getting better housing due the city's renewal
projects, now some families were living in apartments that
were in deplorable condition. There was little sense of
welcome as the buildings and grounds became springboards for
vandals and theives. Some BHA sites had also become
polarized by racial tensions between minority and white
households.
Various government agencies such as HUD and the state's
office of Community Development chided the BHA for its
inefficiency and poor fiscal management practices but very
few, if any, critics had solid solutions for BHAs's
problems. In fact, only with the declaration of receivership
has there been a thorough and systematic effort to both
identify and then address the major operational problems
which shaped the Authority.
As a background for framing the management issues and
subsequent operating strategies implemented during the
Receivership, a general history of the BHA's operational
decline follows.
:14
CHAPTER II
BHA's Operational Decline
Rising Costs and Declining Income(s):
Coincidently, just as many family developments began to
suffer from deterioration and a lack of modernization, Many
families whose incomes were rising as their employment
status improved began to move out of public housing and many
newcomers were families who lived on fixed incomes. During
that time, most public housing authorities had only their
annual rental income from which to pay for routine operating
expenses.
In the late sixties, (1969, 1970, 1971), a
congressional mandate, called the Brooke amendment, affirmed
that the nation's public housing, had to be affordable to
low income families. For the first time in the history of
the nation's public housing program, rents were set at a
maximum of 25% of household income.
Coupled with aging physical plants, a national energy
crisis and unprecedented inflation, the initial effect of
the Brooke amendment was to limit the overall operating
income for public housing authorities. The BHA, like
countless other larger housing authorities, fell further
into an administrative and financial disorder.
By the mid seventies, BHA's vacancy rate would rise to
23%, representing nearly 5,000 uninhabitable units. (3) Many
of its larger developments, such as Columbia Point,
Charlestown, Orchard Park::, West Broadway and others, began
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to suffer from the effects of complete social, physical and
political disarray. Between the period of 1971 and 1980,
BHA's net annual income went from $1,563,000 to a deficit of
nearly $14 million.(4) The median capital expenditure during
that same period, per unit, was $25.97.(5)
Ironically, until the mid seventies, BHA policy
required that, as household incomes rose above a specified
level, the renter was no longer eligible to remain in public
housing. As over-income households had to move away, over
time, the average income of BHA families steadily declined.
The indirect consequence of the Authority's household income
limits was just a families could affort higher rents, they
moved on, (thus paying market rent to a private landlord and
the BHA doesn't compete with the private sector). Between
the loss in rents due to the rise in vacancies, the limited
rents due to the Brooke amendment and the departure of
potentially, higher income households, the Authority's
operating income declined.
The Public Housing's Declining Electoral Clout:
One central dilemma for Boston's public housing program
has been its dual dependence on federal dollars for building
and operating its units and on local government for
political support and local services. Needless to say, many
active resident leaders were forced to leave public housing
at a time when, more than ever, the assistance of the city's
powers was needed to revive the BHA's ailing community
conditions.
Without that "block: of votes", which veterans and their
families had used to influence Boston's city government, the
mayor with his public and private sector resources, did not
provide BHA family developments with any notable public
support. Gradually over time, city services to public
housing developments actually declined.
As the gap between service costs and operating income
widened, BHA's developments went from being important
sources of affordable housing throughout Boston's
neighborhoods, to being characterized as "breeding grounds"
for problems affecting area businesses and homes.(6)
Residents Petition Courts to Improve Housing Services:
In 1970, when the effects of BHA's city-wide decline
began to reach epidemic proportions, residents of the
Authoritv initiated legal actions to demand that their poor
housing conditions be addressed. That year, residents of the
West Broadway, (D Street), filed a suit, charging that BHA
was in substantial violation of the Commonwealth's state
sanitary code, (MGL c111, section 127H). The case was
dismissed because, according to the ruling statement, "more
effective, albeit less heroic, procedures are available" to
residents of BHA to rememdy code violations in the city's
public housing developments. (7)
In 1974, residents again brought suit against the
Authority, this time in the United States District Court.
Again, the complaint was dismissed. The federal judge ruled
that the federal court system was not the appropriate
jurisdictional forum, asserting that,
"in the last analysis, long range answers... (are)
best.. .provided by the political branches of government
(that) have the resources, the duty and the power to make
significant changes in the field of (local) housing." (8)
Residents were informed that Boston's Housing Court, was
established by state legislation, was better suited to
resolve BHA's rampant housing code violations.
In early 1975, Armando Perez and eight other BHA
tenants*, filed a class action suit against the Authority,
and nearly five years later, this class action suit would
lead the way for the the Boston Housing Authority to become
the first, and only, public housing authority in the nation
to ever be placed into court receivership.
The tenants joining originally with Perez as class
representatives were: Maria Laboy, Alejandrina Montes, Mary
Wellings, Margaret Gerkin, Grace O'Leary, Ruby Perkings,
Linda Ferdinand and Delores Culbreath. Two other tenants,
Pauline Morgan and Rita Driscoll joined later. Boston's
Tenant's Policy Council Inc., was also admitted as an
intervening party plaintiff.
CHAPTER III
Manqggment Reforms Predating Court Interventions
Centralized Maintenance Reforms:
During the early history of the Authority, BHAs field
management system had not readily accomodated a strong
directive or supportive role from BHA's central office in
field management affairs. In many respects, each development
had their own policies and practices, which sometimes
conflicted with other development management practices.
These various local management practices and styles, when
combined, often compounded the Authority's already
inefficient approach to providing its maintenance and
management services.
In 197., a resident sponsored evaluation report of the
Authority's operating performance, severely criticized its
decentralized character, (BHA3 Struggle for Survival: 1969-
1973).. In contrast to the Master's report prepared only a
few years later, local managers were described as
uncontrolled operators who set local management policy,
selected tenants, hired and supervised their local staff and
functioned like kings of tiny fiefdoms. Minority families,
for instance, were blatantly discriminated against,
patronage often influenced tenant selection decisions and
BHA's central office got insufficient, or outdated
information on routine local activities such as vacancies,
e>xpenditures for supplies, labor costs etc.
Over the years., the Authority's excessively
decentralized managerial approach had created inadequate and
unclear lines of authority, a lack of budgetary planning and
inconsistencies in the Authority's preventive maintenance
strategies. All, of which contributed to accelerating the
wear of a deteriorating plant.(9)
In response to critics who pointed to examples of waste
and inefficiency in BHA's management system, in 1972, the
Authority had begun the process of modifying its
decentralized management structure into a centralized
maintenance system. Centralization was viewed as a means for
curtailing the powers of the local manager and as a
mechanism for instituting cost saving controls and to
coordinate labor pools.
At first, local management programs seemed not to
suffer from the central coordination of maintenance
services. One consultant to the Authority during the
transition period, describes how centralized maintenance had
quickly begun to improve BHA's maintenance and management
capacity.
"Formerly, the managers of the 55 projects supervised
their own work forces. Then these work forces were
consolidated into a city-wide decentralized maintenance
department. Now the managers have increased influence over
maintenance through district crews. Major jobs, such as the
replastering of a whole room,... (are) handled by central
mai ntenance.
'This makes coordination quite important"...Because of
the improvement in internal communications, (centralized
maintenance) is proving to be... highly cost effective."
(10)
According to the recommendations of BHA's management
consultants, centralized maintenance operations meant that
work orders would be centrally processed, work crews would
be centrally dispatched and the accounting and data
processing system for the Authority's field operations would
be centralized. Managers in turn would devote the majority
of their time to resident oriented functions such as lease
enforcement and office staff supervision.
The tenant selection department had always been a
downtown function, although managers had learned to control
their local tenant selection process. Budget management and
material purchasing became more centrally adminstered and
authority-wide services such as public safety and BHA's
former tenant services department were other downtown
Authority functions related to field management.
Proponents of using a centralized field maintenance
delivery sytem, saw the "downtown coordinating role" of BHA
officials as a way to make local budget decisions, resources
and manpower decisions and to make the day to day
coordination of personnel functions more efficient.
The centralized maintenance model was a mechanism for
improving the quality of management decision-ma::ing. No
longer would there be a lack of uniform policies and
procedures for the allocation of local maintenance service.
Problems like these would be curtailed in a centrally
orchestrated work order system with dispatched labor crews.
The Role of the Housing Manager in a Central Maintenance
System:
One outcome of BHA's efforts to centralize i ts
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maintenance program was the gradual change in the functions
of the Housing Manager. While still responsible for the
overall conditions of the local development, the duties of
the Housing Manager, no longer included tasks such as
maintenance staff supervision, making local budget or
planning decisions.
According to the original consultant report
recommending that the Authority institute central
maintenance and management controls, (the Stone and Webster
Report, 1970), the manager's job was to, "manage tenants,
not buildings". The focus of the manager's role in a
centrally administered maintenance program hinges upon the
concept that,
"the manager needs very badly to be on the same side as
tenants... (when) problems arise in maintenance, as they
will... it is best.. .if both s/he and the tenants "fight"
maintenance (together). (Thus), the concept of centralized
maintenance implies a view of the role of a project manager
as (being) responsible to and allied with the tenants in
demanding (the) effective delivery of services to residents
of public housing." (11)
It was assumed that as the capacity of maintenance services
improved, project managers would, "respond with equal
productivity", meaning increased rent collection, improved
lease enforcement and the added pursuit of socially oriented
improvements for their local development.
The Authority's Maintenance System Continues to Decline:
By the time that the Perez suit called attention to
BHA's declining physical and social conditions, the expected
improvements of centralized management and maintenance
reforms had not materialized. Work order turnaround, for
example, had decreased for a time; then when supplies and
staff coordination could not keep pace, the work order
system again broke down from inefficiency.
Although the 1972 study conducted by residents and
public housing advocates, (A Struggle for Survival. BL
19:9-1973), had argued that the Authority was on the
threshold of making significant improvements in its local
managment capacity, it also reported that deep structural
changes were necessary to fully restore BHA operations.
Below the Authority's administrative level, for
example, the combination of tenure, union representation and
the practice of political sponsorship in employment
decisions, had created a workforce of 500 blue collar
workers and 230 white collar workers who, for the most part,
had no clear sense of what their job responsibilities were.
There was no formal, administrative structure for
assessing and evaluating job performance and there was no
discernable Authority-wide personnel policy. (12) It was an
informal policy of BHA to hire from within the agency, to
promote existing employees to higher positions and whenever
possible, to offer employment positions to tenants and
minorities--subject to accepted practices of poliical
brokering and union membership.
By the late si x ties, four unions had been rec.ogni by d
the Aut h ority, name ly t1h..Teamters, the Building r!T.
in i.cn, the. Lb e Indusri al Ui on and a. Il u..(nio f or
.H... .  r m n --I.. ---. l , tI selection criteria for rating
S:::l icant did not relate to the requirements for the job
position because according to the report, union membership
was more important. (13)
Each successive collective bargaining agreements
governing the Authority's work-force placed more and more
restrictions on crafts jurisdictions and job
classifications. For a long time, in fact, the Authority did
not provide emergency work order service on evenings and
weekends, due to the terms in its union agreement. Out of
utter frustration and a compelling need, the city-wide
tenant organization set up an emergency work order hotline,
during evening and weekend hours, to assist BHA residents
with emergency maintenance problems.
Centralized maintenance and management reforms had,
been heralded as important changes in the Authority's
management structure that could help restore its capacity to
provide responsive housing services. In the short run, the
model seemed to work. Over time, however, centralized
maintenance proved to be utterly chaotic ... particularly
when, the recommended steps outlined by the Stone and
Webster report were never fully implemented.
In focusing the responsibilities and authority of the
Housing Manager to mostly tenant related activities, (lease
ups, income certification, record keeping, evictions etc.),
managers were seldom able to significantly affect the
quality of work order performance and eventually, even the
number of work orders completed were out of their control.
Their credibility amongst residents suffered and the Housing
Manager's leadership capacity was impacted as well.
Instead of increasing the opportunities of managers to
upgrade local management services, centralized control over
local development decisions created adversarial feelings
between BHA's central and field employees. The internal
communication system between the field and central
operations suffered. The image of an isolated and typically
uninformed local manager replaced the former image of the
powerful, independent BHA manager.
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CHAPTER III
Court \'eir sedhting Egcgiv rghig
Prior the declaration of court receivership, Judge
Garrity., had attempted to restore BHA's operating capacity
through other legal measures. The first was through the
appointment of a Master, who would serve as an
organizational expert and court monitor to the Authority.
The second intervening strategy was to implement a Consent
Decree agreement.
Creating a Master's Office to the Authority:
When Garrity initially agreed to rule on the case, he
wrote,
"as indicated by the evidence in this case,...probably
the great majority of the ... units... owned and operated
by BHA as well as the buildings themselves are not
decent, nor are they safe... nor are they in compliance
with the State Sanitary code... that physical conditions
existing in some, perhaps many apartments are so intolerable
that relocation is immediately required,
that... (vacant) apartments.. .constitute a present
danger of fire and disease... that serious crime and the fear
of (it) makes (BHA) developments intolerably
unsafe... (and) the facts... indicate that occupancy by
race in BHA developments and leased housing reinforces
and exacerbates segregated housing patterns in Boston's
neighborhoods." (14)
There was no doubt about the Authority's liability as
a landlord but it was also true that BHA had insufficient
money and expertise to remedy its ever worsening
deterioraton.
So, as a start, Judge Garrity ordered BHA to prepare
plans and recommendations in operational areas of "immediate
concern". Those tasks included identifying vacant
apartments., unfit occupied apartments, planning for major
grounds clean-up efforts, and addressing vandal ism, crime
and racial desegregation within Authority's housing
communities.
The judge believed that BHA needed, "expert assistance"
and appointed a Master to fulfill a technical and monitoring
function. The most important task of the Master was to
prepare interim and long range plans for the maintenance and
rehabilitation of BHA's substandard properties.(15) BHA was
also ordered to fully cooperate with the court appointed
Master.,so that these goals could be met. Without the willing
and competent leadership on the part of BHA's five member
Board, Judge Garrity .::new that the Master's efforts would be
fruitless.
The Master's Findings:
Fourteen months later, on July 1, 1976, the Master
filed a five volume report which was accepted by the Judge.
(Having retired from the Housing Court in October of 1975 to
accept an appointment to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, it
was agreed that the Perez case would follow Garrity to his
new job.) The Master's report found that, "BHA was on the
edge of bankruptcy", because it had failed to bring expenses
into line with its income and subsidies.
Due to BHA's failture to monitor the activities of
its Security Department, public safety services had serious
deficiencies. The Authority was criticized for Board
policies which, "prohibited managers from participating in
decisions affecting their developments" and that BHA's
maintenance operations was an, "impenetrable morass".
The Authority's modernization efforts were, "grossly
inefficient" resulting in major, unjustifiable delays in
capital improvements and development planning unduly focused
upon new construction at the expense of renovating existing
develop'ments. The Master also found that resident
participation in the administration and allocation of
maintenance and modernization funds was severely hampered
by, "inadequate information, poor administration and
management by BHA, HUD and the state's Department of
Community Affairs, (DCA)." (16)
According to the Master's report, the internal
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stated the Master, were
contributing to the dismal performance of the city's housing
agency because they failed to, "see the extent and
seriousness of the deficiences in the traffic of
information", within the institution. One result was that
BHA officals were unable to direct or to delegate authority
or to even determine the capacity of, "some BHA employees to
get the job done." (17)
The Court Moves to Implement a Consent Decree:
When the Master's first report was reviewed, Judge
Garrity concluded that another strategy, "short of
receivership" was necessary to propel the Authority forward
in its operating capacity. So, Judge Garrity reappointed the
Master with stronger powers over the hiring and promotion of
top echelon BHA personnel and ordered the Master to oversee
BHA's operational reorganization.
The judge was particularly concerned with controlling
the divisive, counterproductive and scandalous influence of
BHA Board members over BHA's day to day operations. Towards
that effort, the Judge personally sat down with BHA staff,
attorneys for the plaintiffs, residents and the Master and
drew up a Consent Decree--a document which took over a year
to complete.
With the enhanced authority of the court Master and a
legally binding, statement of goals, tasks and objectives,
Garrity hoped to bring the Authority and its Governing Board
to the bargaining table to establish their administrative
obligations to remedy BHA's substandard conditions. The
Consent Decree became the blueprint for the administrative
reorganization required for BHA to improve the delivery of
its services.
The Consent Decree:
At the forefront of the Consent Decree provisions was
the desire to restore the Authority's capacity to
competently perform all of its operational functions and to
enable BHA to conduct substantive financial planning.(18)
The Consent Decree was to remain effective for three
years., starting from June 1, 1977 when it was signed, until
June 1930, unless any party could demonstrate that the
Decree's,
"further functioning.. .will... be so unworkable
that... (the purposes of the Decree provisions) will not (be)
substantially achieved." (19)
Unfortunately, almost nine months would pass, after signing
the Decree agreement, before the Governing Board actually
hired an Administrator, (March 1978). Until his employment.
there was no chief administrator charged with directing the
efforts of the Authority to fulfill BHA's provisions under
the Decree.
Barely six months later, on October 13, 1978, the new
Administrator, without prior notice, resigned, ( effectively
immediately), and the potential success of the Consent
Decree began to rapidly decline. (20) Within weeks after the
resignation of the newly appointed Administrator, both the
Master and attorneys for the plaintiffs began to file
notices of "Subtantial Non-Compliance" with BHA staff and
Board members, for failing to meet the specfic requirements
of the Consent Decree.
Vacating the Consent Decree:
BHA provisions during the first eighteen months of the
Decree included at least 154 requirements in thirteen depar
tments. The departments referred to in the Decree provisions
were central administration, personnel, financial planning,
purchasing, central project stores, management, maintenance,
data processing, modernization, security, tenant selection,
evictions and the legal department.(21)
Within weeks after the resignation of the BHA's
Administer, both the plaintiff's attorneys and the Master
began to file letters of complaint charging the Authority
and its Board with failing to comply with the provisions of
the Consent Decree which were in effect. Over fifty letters
were sent from the Perez attorneys and the Master submitted
at least twenty-six notices of substantial non-compliance to
BHA's Commissioners.(22) Both the Master and the plaintiffs
requested that the Judge convene a hearing to review their
testimony and petition to vacate the Consent Decree.
Thirty-five days of hearings followed. The Board
contended that its had used the Consent Decree as an
opportunity to bring about administrative and management
changes which,
"can and will lead to a restoration (of) decent, safe
and sanitary conditions in public housing throughout
Boston." (23)
In disagreement, the plaintiffs argued that the Consent
Decree did not provide the structure for resolving the
Authority's larger, more pressing problems of deterioration
and poorly administered operations. To effectively remedy
the BHA's inability to reform itself, the Perez plaintiffs
petitioned for the appointment of a Receiver/Administrator.
From June 1, 1977 until June 1980, when the plaintiffs
petitioned the court to place BHA in receivership, a Consent
Decree, had been in effect. This comprehensive legal
document had been prepared as a working guideline for BHA to
begin the process of bringing its housing into compliance
with the State Sanitation Code. Due to the Authority's
inability to signifciantly adhere to the Decree Provisions,
the Consent Decree was vacated and BHA was placed in court
receivership.
The Accomplishments of the Consent Decree:
BHA officials contended that a total of 138 provisions
were actually completed, or 90. of the total required,
during the period.(24) However, of those incomplete
provisions, 26% related to maintenance provisions, 17% were
related to security while the remaining incomplete
provisions were spread out amongst other BHA departments.
Upon closer examination, critics pointed out that,
despite the claims of the Governing Board, BHA had done
poorly during the first leg of the Consent Decree.
Apparently, nearly half of those departmental improvements
spelled out in the Decree had at least one outstanding
provision which remained uncompleted by the first eighteen
month deadline.
During the hearing, residents testified that basic
services such as heat and hot water, electricity, emergency
maintenance, public safety and extermination services still
had not improved. In its defense, the Governing Board cited
that a number of highly qualified individuals had been
hired, that new personnel procedures for hiring and
promotions and affirmative action goals had been adopted.
The Department of Occupancy had been reorganized and
included a new plan for tenant selection and transfers.
Their biggest achievement, according to the Board, was
the extensive reorganization,again, of the field management
program. During the period of the Decree, BHA's 27 family
developments along with their 38 elderly sites were put into
seven divisions with a District Director for each.
Maintenance activities remained centralized, however, and
the focus of the reorganization effort was not clearly
outlined in the Board's assertions that it could better
deliver its routine or emergency housing services. in BHA's
statement of defense.
During the Consent Decree's first reporting period,
BHA had also rewrote its standard lease with its residents,
in conjunction with the Tenant's Policy Council, (TPC), and
had attracted $37.45 to $41.45 million in funds during that
fiscal period for physical and management improvements
earmarked for family develoments. (25)
The evidence presented during the proceedings sg.tgest
that, in many respects, the Governing Board had little
direct participation in efforts to ensure that BHA achieve
any progress under the egess of the Consent Decree. During
the court proceedings to determine the merits of vacating
the Decree, the judge had interviewed several board members.
In his findings, he describes his disappointment in the lack
of progress made during the first eighteen months of the
Consent Decree.
In his summary statement, Judge Garrity wrote,
The Board's incompetence and indifference to those
obligations, (of the Consent Decree), has directly and
Substantially contributed not only to BHA's failture to
implement important provisions of the Consent Decree but
also to the unprecedented deterioriation of the Authority's
developments and the widespread violations of the Sanitary
Code. Throughout the four year history of this case, the
Board has shown itself to be capable of nothing more than
gross mismanagement. The unabated mis-and non-feasance of
the Board necessitates the extraordinary action of
appointing a Receiver in this case. (26)
The judge was finally convinced that the court's past
approaches to force the Authority to bring its housing into
compliance with the State Sanitary Code and to address its
management, maintenance crisis had not only failed but,
overall, housing conditions in the BHA had gotten worse.
The appointment of a Receiver was the only hope for
ever reversing Boston's public housing conditions.
CHAPTER IV
The Goals of Receivershi
The goals of Receivership are basically the same goals
as those described in the Consent Decree, with added
imperative and capacity to achieve those objectives. The
Receiver is mandated to:
1. halt the Authority's physical deterioration,
2. to bring every housing unit and building up to
state code,
3.. to implement successful management programs
based upon local development needs,
4. to end racial discrimination trends in public
housing and,
5. to renew neighborhood linkage strategies which
provide for the betterment of the city's public
and private housing climate.
By combining the authority of the chief executive with
the powers of the Governing Board, the
Receiver/Administrator has absolute control over BHA's
administrative decisions, policies and operational
practices. Agency leadership is unified, the authority to
implement operational reforms is consolidated. The
Receiver/Administrator reports directly to the judge who, in
turn, delegates any or all decision-making powers necessary
for the Receiver to fullfill the mandates of court
receivership.
A statement prepared by the Authority, provides a
description of the mandates of court receivership:
"The Boston Housing Authority, (BHA), was established
in 1935 to take advantage of federal aid available for the
construction of low-rent public housing. Presently, the BHA
is the fourth largest housing authority in the country with
almost 18,00) units in 68 developments across the city.
Currently, approximately 10% of the population of the city
of Boston is served by the Authority.
In February 1980, after extended tenant-initated class
action litigation, (the Perez case), and operation under a
Consent Decree, the BHA was ordered into Receivership by
Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Paul G. Garrity. The BHA
is presently run by a Receiver/Administrator under the
direct supervision of the court. The Receivership will
remain in effect until the Court concludes that the BHA has
taken any and all actions necessary, desirable and
appropriate to bring conditions in all BHA housing units
into substantial compliance with the provisions of the
Massachusetts State Sanitary Code.
The top priority of the BHA under receivership is to
employ all means necessary to bring its units into
compliance with the State Sanitary Code. Major renovations
and the rehabilitation of vacant units are the primary means
being directed towards this end. Other goals of Receivership
include: promoting strong desegregation and open housing
efforts; stengthening the relationship between BHA
developments and their surrounding communities; developing
and implementing management and information systems which
evaluate and monitor BHA progress; and ensuring inasmuch as
possible that all BHA operations continue to maintain
compliance with all applicable laws during and after the
transition to the post-Receivership period." (27)
These goals may seem ambitious, in light of the many
years of neglect and social isolation which many public
housing communities have had to endure. The goals of
receivership, however, are fairly basic and fundamental
priorities which any good housing authority must incorporate
into their operations. In fact, the provision of safe and
sanitary housing is but a first step in the renewal of the
BHA's long term viability. It is the sustained growth in
community esteem and neighborhood linkages, that are the
most far reaching goals for the Authority.
CHAPTER V
Receivers hip~ Initiatives to Ren~ew BHi's P hvsi cal and
Social Conditions
The central means for BHA to successfully provide
housing services to its residents is through a responsive
and capable management and maintenance program. One of the
first tasks which the Receiver/Administrator completed
during the first six months of receivership was to determine
the overall state of the Authority's housing environments.
What became apparent during that process was that no single
management strategy could be used to meet the needs of a
majority of developments.
The State of the Property upon Receivership:
In order to appreciate the scope of BHA's property
conditions, one is reminded of the broad range of physical
and design features which characterize Boston's public
housing communities. Not only are there ten story, brick
towers congregated in superblocks to be found, but also
semi-detached garden type apartments with private parking
spaces, as well..
Property and community conditions were so diverse that
the Authority established three general categories to
describe management and social conditions. The best housing
conditions were found in developments where a history of
preventive maintenance and capable management services
existed. Public housing sites found in this cateQory had
few, if any, major code violations, the tenant population
expressed satisfaction with their management services and
not surprisingly, many of these projects were recently ::)uilt
or modernized. These public housing developments were
almost exclusively elderly complexes. A few, large but
stable family projects such as Fairmont, Mary Ellen
McCormack and Gallivan Boulevard, also fell into this
category, although all of these housing projects were in
need of some major modernization work.
Overall, BHA's family developments were by far, in the
worst social and physical conditions. Management and
maintenance services were at best, poor, if non-existent.
Due to a backlog of workorders, insufficent local budgets
for major repairs and poor employee performance, physical
deterioration was so advanced that large numbers of units
and buildings had serious code violations. Public safety and
city police services were typically absent and the result
was an increase in crime and vandalism. The most
straightforward indicator of these deplorable conditions was
the number of vacant units which, in some sites, totalled
nearly fifty percent of the apartments.
Developments which were suffering from extreme
conditions such as vacant buildings, fell into this category
include Columbia Point, Bromley Heath, West Broadway,
Fidelis Way, Franklin Field, Orchard Park, Mission Main and
Extension, Cathedral and Charlestown. These projects
required a level of intervention that amounted to the
complete redevelopment of the property.
In effect, short of completely demolishing the
buildings, the Authority's most distressed family projects
would have to be rebuilt from the ground up, in order to
restore the buildings and social fabric of the community.
For sites like like Cathedral, the Missions, Columbia
Point, D Street, Orchard Park or Charlestown, who had
enormous economic impact upon their surrounding areas, the
substance of their neighborhood relations is summed up by
the widespread civic belief that unless the BHA moved to
restore physical and social order in their communities, the
private sector would be forced to abandon the local area.
Other developments such as Maverick, Franklin Hill, Old
Colony and Orient Heights were in equally deplorable
condition but were not categorized as having the same
intensity of social and managerial disorder. The Authority
categorized these sites as places where "stabilization"
strategies had to implemented and from there,
"redevelopment" efforts would follow.
Setting Priorities:
The top priority of the BHA over the first four years
of receivership- was to bring its developments into
compliance with the Massachusetts State Sanitary Code. Major
renovations and the rehabilitation of vacant units have been
the primary methods by which the BHA has tried to achieve
these goals. Other goals include increasing the safety and
liveability of local developments, strengthening resident
participation in decisions affecting their housing services
and to achieve long term fiscal stability.
Vacant Unit Control:
Frojects within blocks of one another were found to be
in physical and social contrast. D Street was crime ridden
and plagued by vacant apartments, substandard bui.din.i
conditions and poor rent collection. Old Colny. only a ew
miles away, while s.t+fering frm seri ou ph7c1 a1
deterioration, h ad ev i dencea of a vi ab 1a nr-mn pr
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Al though the average, overall vacancy rate for BHA in
19 0 was 2 twice that of any other major housing
authority in the nation, the local vacancy rate in family
developments represented a broad range which posed a general
problem in how to organize the the Authority's resources
during the initial stages of receivership. Local vacancy
rates, for example, ranged from 3% to 50%. (BHA's oldest
property goes back to 1938, with 1,0)16 as-built units, yet
it was considered one of the few family projects with
relatively few management problems and a near zero vacancy
rate.. )
Across the city, the Authority had to begin the job of
securing hundreds of vacant units, cleaning out basements
and performing massive grounds cleaning to remove broken
glass, years of junkpiling and abandoned cars. In cot..tntless
-4(')
numbers of buildings, conditions were beyond description,
many lacking entry doors, mailboxes and sanitation due to
burned trash and debris left in common area stairwells and
rooftop passages.
Since 1980, when receivership was declared, the
Authority has managed to stablize all but a few of its
family developments. After boarding up vacant buildings, the
BHA embarked upon a broad based vacancy rehab program. Crews
hired by the Authority completed rehabs which did not
require extensive renovation while modernization contracts,
either as a redevelopment item or as a capital improvements
item, were completed by subcontractors.
While the special vacancy rehab program has been fairly
successful halting the alarming rise in the number of
vacant, uninhabitable units, even today, many, many occupied
units have largely gone without significant improvements.
(Except in developments where major redevelopment has
occurred which also necessitates that the unit be vacated,
temporarily, at least).
Once past the general stabilization process, whereby
the BHA simply moved to "restore order" and to provide at
least a minimum managerial presence, the ensuing management
effort had to establish a means for addressing BHA's poor
living unit conditions.
First Step Interventions-- Matching Need with Opportunity:
Of the family projects in need of immediate
stabilization and maior redevelopment, most were built
4i.
during the fifties--coming to barely twenty years of age
when the Pere_ suit was filed. When in 1979 when the
Authority began the process of tallying the number of vacant
units, city wide, vacant units came to at least 1,872
uninhabitable apartments. Of the severely distressed sites,
Cathedral had the lowest vacancy rate of 26.2"/. with Bromley
Par.:: and Heath Street representing the upper range of the
vacancy range with respective rates of 56" and 6'2% of their
as-built number of units being abandoned.
Located in at least ten different city neighborhoods,
BHA properties are included in nearly twenty electoral
wards, abutting areas ranging in character from single
family residences to two and three decker wood frames to
brick rowhouses that are rapidly being converted into
condominiums. (In 1983, the Authority added a 350 bed,
community residence, the Pine Street Inn, to its roster of
housing units operated by BHA.)
DuLring the first six months of receivership, the
Authori ty centered its efforts on how to best organize and
allocate its existing resources. The Receiver describes his
working strategy as an effort to "balance opportunity with
need". This approach was a way to create important public
momentum during the first months of receivership as well as
to impact the largest area of need possible.
Because the Authority's housing units were located in a
diverse spectrum of neighborhoods, included a range of
physical designs and reflected social conditions which went
from decent to distressed descriptions, it was insufficient
to try and formulate a singular, comprehensive restoration
strategy.
Needless to say, it was a major task to try and figure
out how to appropriately balance the input of central and
field staff during the process of developing management
intervention strategies. The one area of general consensus,
however, was that management and maintenance reforms had to
be a centerpiece in the overall development of methods to
improve BHA's housing conditions.
In order for the on-site management services to be
properly administered, the Receiver/Administrator and his
staff believed that decisions affecting local management
should be shaped by those who bear the most responsibility
in providing those services. The Housing Manager,
ultimately, bears the most responsibility for the ongoing
operations of their development.
In order to facilitate the manag4er's ability to guide
the on-site delivery of housing services, all local
management functions had to be complemented by centrally
organized BHA resources. Although the final authority over
decisions affecting the field management process rests with
the Area Director, a senior staff person of BHA Operations,
the process for deciding how services needed to be provided
would become decentrally organized.
The Decentralized Management Model:
According to the Receiver/Administrator, the concept of
.I 1 :
managerial and maintenance decentralization focuses broad
responsibility at the local development level. In the
Receiver/Administrator's, First Semi-Annual Rejgort to the
Court, he writes,
"If we (are) to get satisfactory delivery of services
and property maintenance, the Housing Manager('s)
responsibilities ... (becomes) the common denominator for all
service delivery...The restoration of managerial
authority... (therefore) is a principle of Receivership.
function of the field operation (by) decentralizing
administrative and managerial functions. (29)
Implicit in this approach is the goal of enriching the
potential resources for the Housing Manager, be it through
increased autonomy in decision-making, added dollars for
improvements and repairs or special management training and
assistance services.
In an institution the size and with the reputation of
the BHA, to implement a decentralized management program is
a delicate proposition. In order to avoid past mistakes and
to creatively work within existing constraints, such as the
BHA's various binding collective bargaining agreements, the
process of preparing for decentralized maintenance and
management initiatives was time consuming.
Roughly some 500 people, work in the Authority's
Division of Operations which includes field management,
construction management, central maintenance, security,
tenant selection and indirectly, some supportive services.
It is an awesome task to relate job functions, employee
performance and operational policy in a manner that achieves
the goals of good management. In the short run, training for
employees, clear job descriptions and other measures of
accountability are created in order to provide the basic
building blocks upon which decentralized decision ma.::in g
depends.
In acknowledging the Authority's commitment to use its
own staff and operating resources to provide the major
portion of its housing management services, the
Receiver/Administrator comments,
"Some might argue that the existing public system of
service delivery ought simply to be dismantled and replaced
with private, contracted services. But there is no evidence
to support the notion that such a large enterprise can be
dissolved, even with Receivership; (and) there is little
evidence that the private sector has much more expertise or
capacity in managing subsidized family housing.Clearly the
level of competence required in planning, construction and
management to achieve the majority of the goals of
Receivership are unprecedented, not only for the BHA but for
most public organizations as well. (30)
In addition to modifying the organizational character
of the Authority, an initiative to decentralize management
decisions implies that resident participation in management
services is proper and essential. Each development has its
own character and neighborhood history and resident
participation in major management reforms is a fundamental
prerequisite for implementing a responsive and effective
management program.
Even with a decentralized approach to preparing
maintenance and groundskeeping services, annual operating
budgets or for monitoring BHA's public safety services, the
comprehensive coordination, planning and necessary
administration required to remedy the wide range of housing
/1.
code violations goes beyond local management capacity. There
are limited capital resources, the personnel constellation
remained subject to the BHA's collective bargaining
agreements and in most public housing areas, city services
were almost totally lacking.
CHAPTER VI
The Management Models during Receivership:
In those projects where substandard conditions were
widespread, management reforms were even more critical to
the comprehensive process of physical and social recovery.
When the Receiver/Administrator began his tenure, residents
felt powerless to protect themselves from thieves and
muggers, drug traffic was widespread, unemployment was
overwhelming and a lack of communi tV and recreation space
isol1ated families on one side of the development from the
Other.
Most important to the efforts of receivership, however,
was the need to generate a management capacity capable of
responding to the Authority's massive numbers of major code
violations. Work orders for apartment repairs had ceased and
basic services such as groundskeeping, ex:termi nati on and
replacing broken windows were sporadically provided. Entire
building systems were deteriorated.
Fidelis Way, for instance, had pinhole leaks throughoLut
its entire plumbing system; Cathedral's electrical system
was anti quated and every time a few households
simultaneously turned on their t. v. 's, washer or dryers, the
building experienced an electrical outage. In short, routine
and preventive maintenance efforts wouldn't scratch the
surface of what was ultimately needed.
Judging from the advanced physical and social decl ine
of the majority of BHA's family developments, the initial
prospects of the BHA bringing its housing into compliance
with the State Sanitary Code were poor, at best, maybe
none>xistent. The money and human resources necessary to make
a dent in the Authority's substandard conditions seemed
insurmountable; particularly in 1980, a time when federal
cutbacks in public housing operating and modernization funds
were near an all time high.
What management approach, regardless of its potential,
could impact conditions such as uncontrolled crime,
buildings standing in near total abandonment and occupied
apartments that were in such poor condition? What
maintenance interventions would at least start the process
of bringing apartments and buildings into compliance with
the State's sanitation codes, given that the routine wor.:
order system could never adequately alter the more serious
housing code viol ations?
The (-ut hor i ty' s Fri vate Management Model:
The typical private management firm working with the
BHA manages, modernized small family developments, (ie, 28
just built Highland Park units, scattered sites managed by
ETC of the South End), or elderly housing projects. In cases
where private management was brought in to manage a large,
distressed BHA property, the development has been slated for
major improvements and comprehensive social supports and
Services. Some of the reason for this contracting tendency
is that the monies for paying a private management firm
could be included in the redevelopment financing plans and
proposal. All but a few family developments were managed,
therefore, under the auspices of the BHA's field management
department.
Using private management firms within distressed family
developments was possible because the Authority could
incorporate the costs and the management model into its
redevelopment plans just as any conventional developer. (The
BHA is one of the few, if not the only, housing development
entity in the city's public sector). Because the financing
mechanism for the substantial rehab of a BHA property was
based upon a turn-:ey formula, this development technique
allowed for the BHA to turn over its property, temporarily,
to a private developer then buy back the complex,< post
renovation at a fix:<ed price.
Through the turn-key mechanism, the Authority was also
able to incorporate private management services to
administer management services during both the redevelopment
and postdevelopment phases of the reconstruction process.
With the combination of future improvements in the physical
and social environment plus the monies earned as a
subcontractor with the Authority, several private firms
responded to requests for proposals from the BHA, despite
the physcially poor conditions which the management firm had
to address.
Another condition which enabled the Authority to
attract capable private management firms to manage several
of its most distressed family projects was that not only
were the buildings slated for renovation but insome cases,
(not includding D Street), a significant percentage of the
res ident population, would ultimately be "brand new" tenants
who were willing to buy into strict, tenant endorsed
management policies.
With the risks of management "losses" at a minimum, or
at least more approximate to the private sector experience,
firms could apply most, i-f not all, of their private
management methods to their management location. For
redevel opment sites such as Fidelis Way, their housing
conditions would dramatically improved as management
services became more effective. Soon, the privately managed
BHA family complex would be the exception, not the rule of
housing conditions found in most BHA family developments.
Another plus was that, in the case where a private
management company was contracted for services, residents
were enthusiastic supporters of the concept.
In many case= where a private management company was
contracted by the Authority, residents were active lobbyist
for the model. In Fidelis Way, for example, the president of
the Commonwealth Tenants Association, Bart McDonnough, said
that residents were concerned that after having fought for
and finally receiving, the funds to fully modernize their
development, they did not want BHA's, "incompetent
management system to come in and mess things up."
Residents perceived that the Authority would not
enforce its lease provisions, would fail to maintain the
grounds and buildings and would be incapable of creating
neighborhood linkages and enthusi asm for Fidelis Way's new
commun ity. Somehow, due t o the powerful incentives of
keeping operating expenses in line with its operating
income, residents felt more confident about the terms of
"accountability" which governs private management behavior
insufficent operating performance, no profit--no success.
Lease enforcement would be consistent, cost savi ng
techni ques would be routine management habits and pride in
the development 's appearance and reputation would be
automat i cal 1 y enhanced by a no-non-ense, management exe pert
whose f ow of income was determ ined by thei r operat i ng
results.
In the case of Fidelis Way, for instance, resi dent s
urged the A uthor i ty to seek out a private management
company, rather than use BHA managers whom residents
bel i eved would be unable to establish a strong mangement
presence.
In the Fidelis Way ex ample, the eBDHA insisted that the
pr i vate management firm encourage full tenant participation
n the preparation and implementation of management r ul3es
and pr-act i ces. With the sanctions of- the Author i ty i t lf a
tenant-manager partnership period was structured into the
redevelopment process. By the construction stage of the
development proj ect , both the private management firm and
its tenant organization held a common and vested iterest in
thI e long term -Sucess Tof the renovated housing c:mp. ex .
The only e. ep t i  pion t :. he pr i vat e management model
b 1i.n located in a moderni Zed devel opment has been the BHA ' s
tenant management model ., which is provided by the B romley
He t:: h Tenant Mana gement A ssociat ion, (BHTMC).
The Atut hori ty' s Tenant Mar agement Model (TMC)
The Bromley Heath TMC, was formed in the late six.ties
in order for Bromley residents to take part in a pilot TMC
program sponsored by the department of HUD. Since that time,
Bromley Heath's TMC program has worked in conjunction with
the Authority as a private management contractor. Through
the TMC's governing board, residents of Brom.ley Heath
(:ontrol management policy.
In general, the BHTMC abides by the same manaQement
poliJ.cies and practices as other BHA family developments.,
although job descriptions, maintenance and repair strategies
may differ in accordance to TMC board decisions. Like any
private management firm, the TMC must function within its
margin of income. With management services provided by the
TMC., t he BHA has focused its attention on upgrading
Bromi ey' s physi ca. conditions. That effort has been
(::oordj. nated by the BHA's Planning and Redevel opment
department with the TMC playing an active roL e in a 1
decisions affecting the development (s).
The TMC is not obligated to pay union wages nor to
abide by the craft and jurisdictional agreements with the
Iu thor :i t y' f our un i ons . By the same tok1en, BHA Li de
personnel or operating policies Such as the work order
dispatch system or Living Unit inspections goals are not
autCmat ical 1ly included in the TMC management approach unless
the TMC Board so rules, or the ALuthority so specifies in
their TMC contract.
Li ke the conventi onal pr i vate management fi rm, the TM'IC
can allocate its labor amongst a variety of job classes and
tasI.::S Like any private company., costs are an important
force in organizing staffing and managerial services. Unlil::e
private management., however, TMCs are legally accountable to
their residents who control the company's board. In addition
to making enough profits to meet expenses, the tenant
management firm considers social and political benef its to
be important operating goal s.
Thus, the TMC model becomes a loose combination of the
pri vate management concept, whi ch seel.::s to increase
potential profits and the public management model whose
mandate is to provide safe, decent and affordable housing to
low income fami lies.
In addi ti on to the fl 1. ex i bi li ty which the pr i vate
management model ex Crci ses over its on-site staff and
managerial resources, there has been a highly collaberative
feature to the Author i. ty' s pr-i vat e management model ,, be it a
TMC or a conventional firm. In every case., BH A residents
hi ave acq.u i red an ex cep t i on a 1 amount of i nput and
participation in the decision making process. Through their
resident organizations, BHA tenants have created or shaped
desi gn, management and redevel opment pol i ci es.
In the BHA's privately managed sites, ci rcumstanc es
have all owed r-esi dents to ex erci se more influence over the
char- ac ter of thei r 1. oc al. man a gemen t structure. Bec use of
the un i que level of modern i z at ion and res ident i nput i nto
man aement ef f orts, i t i. s not c Iear how the p-r i vate
mnanagemerit model will wor k.: in other, more di stressed f ami Ly
prop::jerties of the Au4.tthority.
The Authority' s fair housing goals involve tough and
sensitive housing issues, -the BHA":'s new tenant selection and
transfer policy is equal l y controversial.. How wi 1 1 the
private management model tal.k:e on these issues, use the most
cost effective managerial pri nci p1. es and mai ntai n a cl ose
working relationship with residents? Many of those issues
have yet to be fully examined in either a private management
model or the decentralized management model.
The Authority's newly instituted decentralized field
management program, has been administered by the Authoritv
thorough its Operations department. This manaqement model i.s
organ i z ed around four administrative field supervi sors or
A rea Di rectors, who are empowered to delegate signi f ic ant
authority and decision mak-::ing di screti on to local managers
un der their jurisdicti on.
Implementing the Decentralized Management Model:
One of the first organizational changes which the EHA
had to mal.::e to decentralize its management model was to
reduce the number of middle management supervisors, who were
then referred to a District Directors, (D. D.). There were
seven administrative districts, each headed by a D.D. The
in examining its organizational lines of
accot..intab i i tv, found that their District Directors did not
nterf ace wi th 1 ocal managers in the most productive,
consistent or coherent fashion.
'To streamline the central administrative structure of
the field management department, the number of management
Supervisors went from seven to four, each ta.--ing a
regionally defined area, (east, west, north and South), and
each Area Director, now being fully accountable for all
management issues and needs within their Jurisdiction. Area
Directors report directly to the Chief of Operations, one of
the highest ranking administrators within the BHA.
Each Area Director has worked closely with their field
managers to prepare local budgets, capital improvement plans
and to make local operating decisions. Depending upon the
experience and expertise of the local manager, the Area
Director can delegate full authority for purchasing 1 ocal
supplies, doing local budget management, making field
staffing decisions and conducting performance appraisals to
a local manager. The Area Director is ultimately responsible
for the delivery of management services thorugh the BHA' s
oinsite management team, but short of most maj or decisions or
a crisis, the Area Director does not have to be intimately
involved in day to day operating activities.
On the average, the local onsite management work force
consists of the local manager, a maintenance supervisor who
reports to the manager, a clerk or clerk/typist, a secretary
and several groundspersons such as a laborer, (entry level
title), janitor/groundskeeper and perhaps a work order
c 1 er k.
Crafts people are still dispatched centrally although
sites where extensive craft related work is in progress do
have craftspeople assigned full time to the development.
Glaziers and carpenters-are common examples of a locally
"assigned craftsperson" who may be at a given development,
onsite, ffull time. Except for a few general tasks, until
recently most wor:: orders were completed by craftspeople
whose job assignments were highly regulated by the B HV's
collective bargaining agreement with the Trades union. Thus,
the local wor- order system was directly dependent upon the
ability of the Area Director to help a local manager
maintain a delicate balance between getting the right crafts
person onsite, at the right time, in a timely manner.
The major argument for continuing the centrally
dispatched crafts and tradesperson system is that Area
Directors can "gang" assign special tradespeople to a gi ven
Site with advanced planning. Rather than leave a carpenter
Cr a steamfitter at one place, unconditional.1y, the
centrally coordinated system of assigning specialized
workers, enables Area Directors -to consistently use their
trades people more efficiently.
The biggest onsite management team includes no more
than twenty to twenty five persons working at a local
development. There are constraints which affect supervision
of the groundspeople when the management of-f ice and
maintenance facilities are widely separated, say across the
development from one another, but in most cases, the manager
and maintenance supervisor worI:: in close dail y coordination.
Typicallv local management supplies and the BHA fleet
service are also centrally located, requiring that the
manager maintain steady communications with desi gnated
contacts in purchasing, budget, legal and personnel
departments.
The other major element in the manager's onsite role is
to interact with their residents. All administrative
functions as well as resident oriented communications,
rangin g from lease enforcement to tenant selection, (its a
tenant interview really, final decisions on resident
assignments are made downtown), are managerial task:s.
Administering special programs such as a Fair Housing
S.tbpl an., or preparing a project based budget with residents
or overseeing local security services and projects, also
fral 1 under the local manager's duties. These functions have
been longstanding duties for the BHA manager, predating the
Authority s recent modifications of the Housing Mana ger s
job description.
In addi ti on to reorganizing the deci si on-maki nq
structure of the Authority's proposed decentralized
management program, there would have to be massive doses of
capital, highly orchestrated administrative strategies and
policy initiatives which could serve to enhance the long
term capacity of the Authority to deliver its housing
services. The general reorganization process, therefore,
tried to -facilitate improvements in three major areas of
concern: modifying the role of the Housing Manager,
reviewing the Authoritv's pol]iciess and practices to assict
the management process and f ix ng up local property
conditions.
Redefining the Role of the Housing Manager:
'The current job description of the HOusing Manager is
in negotiation with the Teamsters, the collective bargaining
group for Housing Manager, Maintenance Supervisors and a. 1
Clerical and Office Workers. The basic features of the
AIuthority's proposed job description includes the authori tyV
to supervise all mai ntenance personnel, including a role in
the hiring and terminating of local employees. The present
job description for the Manager includes the dir-ct
supervi si on of the maintenance supervisor but the Housi ng
Manger is not authoriz -ed to fire an employee.
AS mentioned, managers are responsible for the
preparation of local operating budgets, they participate iln
the process of preparing a local capital. improvements plan
and performs or del egates al. field rel ated record keepi ng
and all tenant servi ces ft..nctions such as income
certi f i cation, enforcing BHA's lease provisions, and wior.:inq
wi th resi dent and community groups.
The most controversial area of expanded responsibi 1 itv
has been the Housing Manager's role in hiring, evaluating
and the termination process of an unsatisfactory empl oyee.
Appl i cants are screened by the central personnel of f i ce, on
an ongoing basis. When a manager needs a worl-::er, prospective
candi dat:es are Forwarded to managers who interviews and
s ec::ts the job f inalist in collaberation with the Area
Di rector. The manager can determi ne the c:ond it: i ons= of an
mpl oyes pr ob at i on ar y per i o d. as well, 
In addition to participating in the hiring process., the
manager is now asked to make recommendations on promotions
or even, demotions for all onsite personnel. The majority of
BHA managers have expressed great satisfaction with their
expanded role and job duties withi n the BHA's field
operations. There is greater performance competition amongst
mariagers and respe(:t for the j ob, within the A.uthorijtv, has
grown. The revised job description of a Housing Manager has
been central for the improved delivery of management
services although the expanded role of the field manager has
been prob Il emat ic for the Housi ng lanager' s un ion
neg oti ators.
Un i on Membersh i p Pr obl ems:
Managers, mai ntenance supervi sors and al. ]. Cli. ri cial
personnel are members of the the Tamsters., wh ch i n the
days prior to the BHA's decentralized management system., did
not create maj or conf. i cts of interests as it does today .
'The Massachusett s State and Civil Service E mplovees
A(ct., (G3eneral Law, Chapter 150 Section E) ., regul ates the
rights of public employees to form unions and to negotiate
ol. .ec t i ve bar g an i ng agreements with their emp1. oyers.
The act defines who public employees are., (150 E,
ecti on 2) ,,spells out craft and employer units, (150 A.,
secti on 5) and addresses aspects of representati on,, such as
rig hts to grieve a :ersonneI dec i si on. The 1aw al so
established that the maximum term of a collective bargaining
agreement was three years and fully describes the authority
and purpose of the state's Labor Relations Board.
Since around 1968, when the Teamsters began
representing Managers, Maintenance Supervisors and Clerical
Workers, the authority to hire and fire field management
employees rested with manager supervisors, (now referred to
as Area Directors), who are not authorized members of the
collective bargaining unit under Chapter 150 E. (They are
considered management, who by definition, are engaged in
policy making activities). Within this arrangement, managers
functioned as line staff and remained within the
jurisdictional bounds of the state and civil service
defined collective bargaining unit.
While the Authority, in principle, has delegated hiring
and firing responsibility to the Housing Manager, as well as
performance appraisal, it has been unable to f-ormally
incorporate those duties into the job description of the
Housing Manager without risking the union status of the
Housing Manager. As an employee designated to make hiring
and firing decisions, the manager, by definition of
organizational authority becomes a "manager"/ administrator,
a job classification which is not eligible to be included in
the Teamster's current collective bargaining unit.
In addition to the controversy over the ex:panded job
duties of the Housing Manager, given the present union
construct, managers report that it has been a camplicated
task to actually terminate or reprimand--or sometimes to
objectively promote, fellow union members.
Although laborers are not in the same union, (they are
in the International Brotherhood of Laborers), with the
Housing Manager, virtually every other on-site field
employee is. Regardless of the management style or grounds
for reprimand, in cases of dismissal or demotion, unions in
their responsibilities to protect the work rights of their
members usually must act to grieve a management decision.
Given the expanded role of the field manager to
participate in local hiring and firing decisions, union
grievances are, in essence, being filed by one union member,
against another, (managers are co-defendants, so to speak,
with Area Directors who retain the final right to hire and
fire field management employees.) In most cases of poor work
performance by a local maintenance worker, managers have
sufficient documentation to resolve poor performance
disputes although grievances must still be settled by the
Labor Relations board, if a worker so requests.
In the ideal situation, unions never face such conflict
within their midst because the "rank and file" is always
distinquished from the organization's management ranl.:s. In
this less than ideal situation, managers report that
resolving performance problems with fellow union members. is
one of the most difficult aspects of their expanded rol .s
(1)
There is a future of uncertainty ahead with the end of
court receivership and the prospects of Housing Managers
rej ecti ng their union in lieu of their revised job
description is unlikely. Managers do, however, embrace their
new job description and hope For a reasonable compromise
between the union and Authority during this next collective
bargaining agreement.
One obvious option is to form a separate union For
Housing Managers. This is not a likely option,particularly
under the circumstances of removing the Authority out of-
court receivership; managers do not want to loose their new
found capacity to direct local operatons but they are also
equally concerned about k-:eeping their jobs should the city
fail to monitor the influence o-f patronage in employment or
promotions. The separation of the Housing Manager, into a
distinct bargaining entity, however, is a pressing matter
and warrants long range assessment and analysis.
In comparing the Authority's decentralized management
model with private management or tenant management model s,
neither private management model is faced with the same kind
of union controversy. None of their private management
firms, (Corcoran, OKM, Emergency Tenants Council, Rox bury
Action), nor their tenant managment corporation, (TMC),
counterparts are unionized.
Thus in many respects, the private manaqement model
tends to avoid conflicts due to jurisdictionl restrictions
and does not create internal conflicts within the BHA's
management strucuture. By the same tok-en, it is not clear
nor evident that private managemeit firms, despite their
added flexibility in using their human and capital resources
are capable or i nterested in managing I typical. physi caly. y
aged BHA(s f ami Iy ho.s. ing developments.
Obvi0usl., the manacemenit model which can use its 1 abor
and resident resources most efficiently is most desireable.
Pri vate management., in the absence of a union, for exampile,
has +ar more freedom in al locatinig its resources. ~These
management model s have yet to be tested in the waters o
ma.j or BHA pol i cy i ni t i at i ves whi ch go beyond addressing a
specific devel opment : s needs arnd or circumstcance.
The root of the A uthori ty' s most deep seated probl ems
related to its overall inability to properly service its
housing communities. New pol:i cy initi at ives, comp l. ementar y
adm i ni strati ve goalsa and improved (:oitract practi ces, be i t
a c ol l ec t i ve b arc gaining agreement or a service contract,
spek to issues which go beyond the 1oc:ail management model.
Impr ovinog1 he Ar.thoritv's Collectiye Barg airing Agrin eements:
Si ce recei versh i p was dec 1 ared , the Author i tv has
niegot i ated colectie bargai n i n agreements with all four of -
ts un i on g r oup s Ac cord i t C the BH As per sorinvel di re or
each agreement has ui ti matel y enhanced the management
capacity of the Ac"uthoritv. The first Teamsters contract, was
si grIed i I 1.982. A new contract i s i n riegot i at :i on now. The
B(ui 1 di rIg and TradeS Council represent i ng 3'5 0 caft s workers
empo :yed by the BAP-1, c. osed their latest col. 1 ect i ve
bar g a i 1,. n q agreement i r September of 1 98 aid the Laborer '
ti nt erni at. i on a j us-t comp let ed an agreemei t iMarch of 1 984.
The most not abIe ea ramp ge of m ement i mp r ovemen t
C.'
achieved t hrough the collective bargaining process was the
recent 1 y si gned B9ost on Biing. d ii and Tr ads Counc i 1 l abor
agreement,, The contr ac t spec .i f ys 3'5 nei..tr a I t asks ofT th ich
any craftsperson, regardless of .job classi-ficati on or trade,
can perform.. With this set of "neutral tasks", a carpenter
can now start and c:omplete many assig inments which, under
former labor agreements, would have requi red several
t r adespr ons to comp 1 ete var i ots semi s-i 11 ed tasks,, Wi th
this new work agreement , the Authority v has cleared tie way
for making major i mprovements in it work order system.
The Authori ty's Living Unit Inspection project, for
iapl, wi 11 form the foundati on -for a wrk-:: order system
that wi11 allow Lhe Author i tV to 1in : i ts apartment and
bui I di ng mai ntenance schedule to a systematic i nspection
process involving all :BHA apartments. In order to el i mi nate
i t a nui..meroaus housi ng code vi ol at i oa, the BfH must hae a
comprehensiv invant ory of t: he ir h o t..tsi ng p rob I ems.
The HA s Li vi ng Un i t Inspect i con Pr ogr am f 11 owed t h
uli on agreement b ec at..tse feat t..tr as cf the new c on t r act made
such a program vi able and f easible. Wit an improved work
order system, the BA can also enhance its preventive
mai ntenance and repair servi ces.
The other -f eature of the new Trades Cct.nci1 aqreement
was the cr eat :i on of twe.nty generic main 4ten anc ie .ob: - i c h
i nvol vd fai r 1ly tnsk:: ill ed task-:, ( cha ng i ng soap di shes,
)t el r ac- k ,, switch p ats., ocks etc. . For t he s1ae c,-f
f f i c i onc y and 1 ab or c ost,, the Aut--irty arh eed t:. i t FJ
Ih oul .d n - pa an e1 ectr ic ian cr pl Imb1er an average - $ :1.5
d: 1. l. ar pe r hour ts o p erf orm tsch asks Especi gv e. on
tha t 1i-1 r s it 11 i ar e nceded li cwhere.
Through gradual. i mn provemTents in the ir cOeI cti ve
bargai ni ng :ovenants,, the fAuthori ty has tried to convey its
operati. onal priorities in a manner that enab les its . unions
t. o work :in (oncert with larger organizat :ional needs. I-f a
decentralized management model is goning tosucceed, the BHA
must est ab Ii sh a -F i rm sen se - :J. i t( man agemen t needs i mpr ove
its abiity to improve its physical conditions and estab lih. i h
a supervi sory mechanism whi. ch provides each worker wi th
ob3j ect i Ve in.formation about their job per-formanc-e. I n turn
good j :b per f- or mance c an be ro war ded .
Inter-fac ing with Pl anni ng and Constr.. cti on Departments:
One area f ccontention iis the unde-f ined rol wh :i ch
managers h ave i n the pl ann i ng and ph ysc i a. . mpr ovemen t s
process t wo cr i i cal ac:t i -v it iLes wh i ch are centr all 1 y
coordinated. Take an example -f rom Mi ssi on Main, as an
iu1 1LsFt. rat i on c.-F one l ca: a m anagement i e,, I ACE?.. 1: t i s c e ar t h at
the ei. st. ig boi 1e r is need r op a i r d the rep 1. ac ement -f
some parts. During the budget planning p'roces , the manager
and area director, prepared a capital improvement budget
I hat included new boilers C. ent ral pl anni ng, budgt i ng or
thoe cnstruction management dep artmnt., eac h ave a -Fl: 11 ow
u.C:m r le i i mp e menI. g Mi so i on Ma ii i r qe st -f v-or u pgraded,
ne w or r ep a i red ho i :oer s.,
WJhen, or i f ,, the b )i I. r syst em wi 1.1. e I . at....ed -F or
r ep::a ac:men or r i r s 3, i 0uknown o 1 the manager u nt i 1 m ost
: te J. pci de (a til i are f i lzed Id ea l., a ha v an c iAd .
inpu ti in :t th Iei in ater :i o1a r p ro u r- F ct r :. sL el ec 1 in p r o ccs iss aso w. el
as the p::: r opoCsed s c hedLI i ni p ro c(ess. iw 1. d i nl c: r esE the
manager' s ab 1 i ity to address. on-si te prob l ems. which are
rel ated to the poor condi tions of the boilers.
Other policy and operational pr-act ices are of ten lost
i n t he ogj ai between f i el d and cent ral act i vit i eso and
cont i n.e efforts are in progre t o i mprove pr obI 1 ems where
possible 0. Recenl y,, the Author ityL publI ished a Lhr ee voluime
operat i on s: man .a wh i ch i s i nt.:enIdc to al lev i ate some of
thes.e types of operat.ing problems,, It is an important step
i oforialiing operating procedutres., al though most managers
1 ooked at the huge vol .. imeso and shook their heads in si l Ence
Tei In fuOsion of Capital Resources:
D no ma jor c: omp on en t of he A t..t t h r i t y:'s over all.{1. i e 1 d
man agemen t approach has been to i mp 1 emen t a cap i al
. mp r ::ivement p r o g r am i n vol vi ng $5.. 9 mi l. i on dol 1. ar s i n
srp c hi al vac an cD y re h ab monSi es. and to i i t i E.o i : : maj or
redevel opment pro.j ec:ts. total 1 i ng over ! 1 . 6 mi 1 1 :in cIdol 1 ars
as of f i sc al year :L98~
Freparing physsi cal rescue plans for several of the bi g
devel opmenL s was., and reiains. c omp Ii cated by Lhe fact that
tn ypi call y ., modern i Z at i on ass. . ista nc e depended uj on the t ype
of : tUbl Ii c subs i d y uSed i11 n *Lthe or i g . ri I In rst r uc: t i on of t he
dc eve 1 oapm en t-, Fed e r a . d eve 1 op men ts. we r-e not ab 1.e t S e At at e
iI id : or- r no a >is, :: c pt Lb y ip ec i al l e .i s. aI i v e
appFr oval, wh i I st atea f i nan c: ed proj e(:ts were i noi g i L::1 cr
certain federal modernization monies.
The short of the story is that regardless of how bad
physical conditions had gotten, "available" sources of
financial aid were not readily interchangeable. In effect,
once the Authority determined the modernization needs of a
given development, the next prerequisties involved matching
state or federal sources of funds. (or using a creative
financing solution such at at Franklin Field which involved
swapping section 3 subsidies with state programmed monies
etc.)
As mentioned, the Authority has attracted and properly
managed an enormous sum of money to complete capital
improvements and to redevelop Fidelis Way, West Broadwav,
Fran.:lin Field, Columbia Point, Cathedral, Mission Main and
Bromley Heath projects. The management programs at these
redevelopment sites have included formal agreements with the
1 oc al tasks forces which included a role in the developer
selection process, relocation and supportive services
agreements and post redevelopment management strategies.
One trend which has emerged from the overall
redevelopment process has been a total reduction in the
number of as-built units, which has been a matter of concern
for both residents and BHA officials. Certain density and
design features have tended to compound management and
maintenance problems. Residents working with the Authoritys
pL anni ng staff have examined and debated many of these
i ssues and amongst tenants with creative solutions bei ng
implemented. (Tak.::e Fidelis Way, for example, where residents
factored in a public car repair lot to deal with fix:<ing cars
on the premises, minus the eyesore and security problems)
One of the biggest drawbacks, so to speak, in the
overall experience with complete redevelopment has been
the overall reduction in apartment units. In order to
achieve the private space qualities or adequate unit sizes,
to facilitate better pedestrian circulation or to allocate
monies for other uses, the trade-off has been to reduce the
number of original units after redevelopment.
One additional feature of the Authority's capital
repair programs, be it total redevelopment or modernization,
has been the collaberative experience of residents and BHA
Staff during planning and construction management periods.
Typically, indepth post-development management plans
.are prepared during the redevelopment planning process with
full resident participation in establishing post occupancy
management rules, final design characteristics and community
space uses. Across the board, residents have been an
important driving force behind the local development
process, although the priorities of residents have differed
fro)m development to development. The common outcome,
however, is that the manager, central BHA employees and
residents have had to work hard over time, to establish the
teamwork.::, trust and a mutual confidence necessary to mae.:
the capital repair program a success.
Improved Financial Management and Planning Ferformance:
Since receivership, the Authority has also reduced the
amount of operating funds allocated for central office
overhead eXpenses and increased its funding allocated for
on-site management and maintenance . When the first fiscal
year of receivership began, the Authority had a residual
deficit of approximately $1.5 million dollars and was
required by HUD to prepare a financial workout plan that HUD
approved and monitored. As of the end of fiscal year 1983,
BHA had eliminated its residual deficit and achieved a net
increaseof $6.9 million in its operating reserve, (although
this amount is still below the HUD defined minimum operating
reserve level).
From a fiscal standpoint, the Authority is in far
better shape than anyone ever imagined, including the
biggest optimist, namely the Receiver/Adminstrator Harry
Spence, himself. Back in January of 1984, Spence recalled a
conversation which he had with Judge Garrity during the
first six; months of court receivership.
He told his listeners that Judge Garrity had ask-::ed him
to estimate how much it would cost to bring the Authority' s
properties up to code, never mind where the money would come
from. "In that case," responded the Receiver/Administrator,
"at least $200 million--if not a quarter of a billion
dollars". (.2)
The figure was not too surprising, but the subsequent
success of the Receiver in attracting nearly that amount of
money in the four year period following the conversation has
been an unexpected achievement. Eqt..tal ly surprising, has been
the Authoritv's ability to manage and efficiently allocate
those monies.
The BHA has also gotten tough on its intentions to
rigorously enforce their minority vendors and a-ff i rmati ve
action policies in contracting and subcontracting, and in so
doing, has aided the larger community effort, to counteract
the city's longstanding endorsement of discriminatory
contracting practices.
Provi ding Improved Central Department Supports:
The Authoritv altered its view of how central
departments interface with field operations, reorganized
various central departments such as legal, personnel, tenant
selection, civil rights and planning. The Authority also
created new departments such as construction management
which completes modernization work under through a Force
AccoU nt crew, prepares contracting bids and monitors the
Atuthority's construction contractors.
BHA's energy management, rapid reoccupancy procgram and
public: sa fety services are central activities which are
closely coordinated with the local management program. These
department and program efforts are a few Useful examples of
how BHA has tried to strengthen the ability of central ly
administrated activities to assist field management
functions, despite their varying levels of success. The
ability to assist the delivery of management services is one
of the main considerations when departments are charged with
coordinating departmental resources.
Appeal s for Publ i c and Fri vate Resources:
Over the past few years., the BHA has attempted to
establish a constellation of special service programs in
education, job training and employment, recreation and
public safety and to sponsor various in-service training
events for employees. An intensive, management internship
program has also been developed and serves as an important
vehicle for increasing the Authority's appeal to
perspective, hiqh caliber employees. The Authority also
coordinated several sources of private and public resources
to assist resident organizing and training efforts.
Perhaps the change in the role of the Housing Manager
and the infusion of capital resources to upgrade physical
conditions found in various family developments are the two
most important features of BHA's management strategy under
cot..trt receivership. To increase the autonomy of l.ocal
managers to direct field affairs has required that the BHA
establish more concise measures of accountability for local
man ag ement performance. The most important tool of
management reform, however, has been the Receiver's ability
to capture adequate funds for basic operating costs and
ongoing capital improvements projects.
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CHiPTER 'v'II
P'olick cvad ira ining Iniitiatives to Improve Housing Services
The BHA's tenure in receivership has begun the
important process of bringing many of the Authority's
substandard units up to code. To this day, however, there
remains innumerable apartments and buildings that are
affected by serious housing code violations. There remains
an enormous task to successfu.1y bring a]. 1 of the
Authori tys properties into compliance with the State
Sanitary Code. Through resident and management training,
its housing policies and community resources, the Authority
has attempted to improve its housing services.
Manager Training Activities:
Management training has also been stressed, both for
newly hired manager interns and for experienced managers.
In-service training topics include project based budgeting,
capital planning sk::ills, preventive maintenance practices
and the like. Perhaps the most exciting training venture has
been the Authority's management intern program which is a
Vear long, intensive field and academic management training
curriculum which has been the subject of lots of praise from
management interns in particular.
According to Terry Lane, a consultant from Abt
Associates of Cambridge, and the coordinator of the
iuthoritv' s first management training cycle, (1982-1983.)
the management training program includes five major stt..tdy
areas. Organized as an intensive combination of field work:
and classroom studies, si management interns ta.:e cl asses
in human behavior, community dvnami cs, maintenance and
management principles and a weelkly seminar which is designed
to integrate the field and classroom activities of BHA's
management interns.
Courses are taught at the Boston University School. of
Social Work by their faculty or consultants while field
placements are with experienced senior managers, (managers
are ranked by experience from 1 to 3, with level 3 managers
being assistants to senior managers--level 1).
One feature of the management intern program is that
all trainees spend time in every department within the
Authority in order to gain first hand information about the
worlk:ings of the department. Field placements are also
tailored so that a variety of management styles can be
observed as well as a range of local management conditions.
The goals of the management intern training program are
described as,
"providing managers with a sense of the real lob that
they will one day face. We want to give managers the skills
and knowledge to carry out management functions by teaching
them to be problem solvers in a changing world-- in a
changing (housing) authority and system. To be effective
(as a BHA manager) is dependent upon your ability to adjust,
to be opportunity oriented and know how of the larger
institution (and its workings). Our fundamental message to
management interns is that the job of the Housing Manager is
to serve tenants, to create a community and to keep track of
the basics, like materials and worker performance, which
characterizes a local management operation." (33)
There is a perspective which is integrated into the manager
intern training program; it is thematically linked to a
notion that BHA's Housing Manager , not a distant, downtown
authority ffigure, will be the symbol of the city's public
housing agency.
Management Relations with Tenant Organizations:
There is a the catch-22 problem in spelling out the
specific the role which residents have witin the local
decision making process but there is little doubt that local
managers must find a way to include legitimate resident
input in their planning and assessment activities.
Management and resident relations during receivership
have primarily been structured within a collaberative model.
BHA's assumptions are that residents and 'Local managers have
common, if not the same, housing and community interests. It
has been an explicit goal of both the Judge and the
Receiver/Administrator to encourage the "empowerment of
public housing residents" to impact the actions of the
Authority and other institutions whose services and support
shape the lives of public housing families.
One of the most central concerns about the viability of
decentralized decision-making is how to frame the
participatory role of residents within the process. If there
is one area of management reforms which has been difficult
to structure, it has been the Authority's effort to achieve
an appropriate means of seeking resident input versus
control over local management decisions.
There is an important distinction between management
reforms which promote resident participation and reforms
that enhance the abi l i ty of residents, throt..th their
orcanizations, to to attain a partnership role in resource
1.
al 1 ocat i on. During recei vershi p there has been a lot of
tallk about resident empowerment but that has been difficult
for either tenants of the Receiver/Administrator to define
and pursue. Experience to date has been more akin to
encouraging tenant input, rather than control over their
local management program.
There is a distinction to be made between resident
participation in management decision mal.::ing and having solid
evidence of being able to exercise control over how local
management resources are allocated or assessed. Since the
late sixties, when public housing residents formed local
chapters and a city wide organization to advocate their
housing needs, the general experience of resident
organizations has fallen into two political categories.
One is being closely identified with the interests of
management and therefore a cooperative model of working
together i s pref erred. The other is bei ng c. osel y i denti. -f i ed
with.  the interests of residents and therefore any method
- or pursui n g the intere.ts cf residents will be used,
i ncludinq confrontation tact i cs.
In the first category, the tenant organization often
getS used to assist or to justify management decisions which
many residents do not support or are adversely affected by.
When a tenant organization and its leaders elect to work
exccliU sively through a collaberative mechani sm, the need to
avoid conflict with the Authori ty can become restrictive .in
selectinq strategies to advocate resident interests and
perhaps, even compromise their basic goals aS a group.
Take for instance, an issue in which a BHA poli.cy is
the cause of a specific resident problem. Unless the
Authority can be persuaded to modify its position, the
resident organization's options to use confrontational
tactics to force the BHA to compromise its position on the
issue is diminished. Confrontation is a less desireable
strategy to the resident group because the importance of
cooperating with BHA staff outweighs the potential gains of
being adversarial.
There are of course, important benefits to being able
to work closely with management, visa the representative
tenant organization. The internal characteristics of the
resident organization, however, can be influenced by the
role of its leaders and the manner in which the gro.U p
establishes its priorities. The past tendency of BHA tenant
leaders who worked closely with BHA staff and policy mak::ers
is that those representatives, over time, stopped feeling
obl::; i gated to represent residents who disaqreed wi th thei r
leadership ideas.
To protect themselves, some of these leaders began to
avoid group decisionmaking activities and often actively
discouraged democratic review of issues. The housing
authority' s staff tends to prefer to wor.- wiith
representatives of tenants rather than large groups of
people and typically, treat resident leaders with enormous
credibility, irrespective of the internal. deci si. onmaki ng
practices of the organization. The combination of these
f actors can add up to a 1lac:: of influence over public
housing services for a maiority of BHA residents.
For the most part, field managers have not shared
control over onsite management decisions with their resident
organizations unless there has been a contractual agreement
or understanding which formerly spells out the management
functions or service under discussion. Resident input and
participation in the process of decisionmaking, however, is
fairly common. Many BHA managers tend to seek out resident
input on local matters but are less willing to provide a
controlling interest to tenants in the decision making
p r 0 c e ss.
This is in part, due to the fact, that when a
management decision is made, the process includes not only
review and analysis but actions must follow. Decisions must
incorporate clear accountability for the results of a given
decision and typically some followup is required as well.
Most management decisions entail money, or manpower or both.,
atnd it is not surprising that often, because the BHA
controls the purse strings, the Authority's needs have the
most influence over the final outcome. Thus, one good
indicator of the level of resident control over local
management activities is to look.:: to formal and informal
agreement between the resident organization and management.
In looking at the role of resident participation in the
field management activities of the BHA during receivership,
there is a sense that local histories and the level of BHA's
capital resources have become variables in the tenant-
management dial Og ue. There is some genuine confusi on or
uncertainty in the minds of both residents and BHA staff as
to what constitutes "empowerment" when contrasted with
notion of resident participation in the local decision
making process.
Resident relocation agreements, for ex:ample, define the
responsibilities of the resident organization and the
manager in the process of relocating families during a
redevelopment effort. The fair housing sub plan, on the other
hand, involves resident participation in setting goals, but
BHA remains responsible for marketing the development to
perspective tenants, (except by agreement, such as at Orient
Heights, when residents performed some marketing tasks). The
role of residents and their organizations are fairly
distinguishable in these two examples because resources are
involved, a formal agreement and an informal agreement are
evident and both management iSSues require cooperation
between managers and tenants in order to ach i eve the
specific goal.
Undoubtably, since receivership, there has beem an
attempt on the part of many BHA managers to create
opportunities for resident groups to become active, and even
influential, forces in the the local management program.
With the end of receivership approaching, for those projects
where major housing code violations still exi sts, the stakes
a re even higher if residents loose their ability to w ork
towards i mproved housing services. It is also clear that the
subject of resident organizational development and tenant
empowerment are inseparable.
In general, most BHA managers have an investment in
working with resident groups, because they are aware of the
important role which tenants play in makI--ing making
management services more responsive to the needs of
residents. Typically, BHA staff people expect to work with
BHA tenants within a collaberative model. Within a
col laberative model however, there are important strategies
which the resident organization must rely upon to maintain
their credibility and power. Decisions must be made openly
and democratically and a large membership base are
fundamental survival tools if the organization is to achieve
its goals.
The ongoing potential for sustaininq BHA's field
management re-Forms depend upon the ability of residents to
influence control over their houSing services. In turn, the
capaci ty of resident groups to address the needs of publ i c
housinq tenants depends upon the representative capacity of
resident organizations. Tenant leaders must be accountable
to their membership and that in turn best assures that the
interests of residents are carefully integrated within B3HA's
Field management practices.
Policv Initiatives to Assist Housing Management:
BHA also made a range of -fforts to tailor its
org .ani zati onal policies to assist the Authori ty' 1. onq term
revi tal i z at ion. Some of these policies are aimed at
upgrading tenant services, others are intended to modi-Fy the
population who live in public housing. Others are to enhance
lease enforcement. Combined, these major policy reforms have
suggested that the Authoritv is serious about charting a new
direction as a low rent housing agency.
Lease enforcement,- for example, got a major boost when
the Authority successfully petitioned the legislature to
establish an emergency procedure for speeding up the cause
eviction process involving serious crimes.
Tenant selection practices were also modified to
include screening of public housing applicants to determine
their history in rent payment and tenancy. Those applicants
with poor records are no longer accepted in public housing ,
which is a major contrast to BHA's prior tenant selection
practices where it was rare that a perspective tenant was
rejected because of a poor track record as a renter.
'erhaps the most controversial policy affecting public
hcutsing tenant selection has been the Authority' s recently
instituted
In brief,
who have
applicants
inti 1
househol ds
Sel ecti on.,
res-i dent s
ratji than
limits for
income-tiering or Broad Range of Income pol icy.
the Authority intends to treat working households
applied for apartments differently than those
on fixed incomes.
the Authority wide percentage of working
reaches 50'.4 according to the Authority's Tenant
Assignment and Transfer Plan, public ho t..tsiing
who are employed will be admitted at a hi gher
unemployed applicants. The cLrrent maximum income
acceptance into state or federal devel. opments
range from $12,180 for a single person to $21,750 for a
family of 8 persons. (Applicants may have assets of up to 1
and a half times of the maximum income limits).
Those who are most affected by this policy are the
poorest families and individuals who have no alternatives
other than make-shift shelter. As a public housing resource,
the BHA has in effect elected to limit at least half of its
13,000 units to the working poor, rather than to all poor.
It is ironic that many longtime residents of public housing,
would today be less able to compete for a BHA unit. Only
through the prolonged efforts of the city's poorest, had the
Authority been brought to public scrutiny.
'There is just cause for concern about the Authority's
fate as an insitution which serves only the poorest; but
there is an equal11y compelling need to fill such a role
until real, accessible means of providing affordable shelter
to the needy household can be demonstrated.
Some of the rationale for the Broad Ran4e of Income
policy stems from the fact that public housing communities
have been areas of extreme poverty and unemployment. The
ensuing social conditions are common subjects of debate, but
few if any insightful conclusions can be drawn. Voter
registrati on, community employment initiatives and expanded
educational and economic opportunities are all i mportant
ingredients for assisting poor communities. Thus, if the
Broad Income Pol icy is to have any basis as a means oif
enhanci ngq the social fabric of a local development., then
A1
mployment and education, training and placement assistance
must be incorporated into the Authority' s management and
communi ty priorities.
In weighing the merits of the Broad Income Policy with
the management needs of many local developments, there is
little evidence that poor families cause management costs to
rise.. its more often the case, that poor households pay
such low rent, that the Authority could never operate on its
rental income. There may be some increased income benefits
for a housing agency with a minimum of half of its
households capable of paying rents that approximate the
market value of the unit. There is little specific
evidence that poor households necessarily cause management
costs to rise, as illustrated in elderly housing. However,
there are social costs which are related to unemployment,
pcor education and employment resources. The rising
percentages of single female, head of househoId wage
earners, whose incomes, on average are less than their male
counterpart, are indications that poverty in public housiing
will not be seriously reduced. that poverty will be
significantly reduced in costs seem to be a factor in public
housing developments where unemployment is high, when
educational and employment resources are scarce.
Neighborhood linkages are often more difficult to
establish when public housing communi ties become
economically segregated at the lowest end of the poverty
1cale. For years, many family development projects were
Ihunned by their neighbors and served as convenient
sc:apegoats for area decline. Through income mixing, the
AuLtthority seems to believe that opportunities for social and
economic intereaction between public hOuSing residents and
the larger community are increased, or perhaps less
limited.
E29Etiye Services and Commun ity Resources
Having described the major features of the AuthoritV's
management strategy, there is one common thread which holds
these elements together and that is the functions of the
field management program depend largely upOn the the quality
of BHA's personnel and policies. The Authority's Supportive
Services program, is probably one of the few BHA program
areas where resident organizations are expected to develop,
direct and to basically operate a public housi nQ servi ce.
These communitv oriented services are indications of
the Authoritv's efforts to acknowledge the linkages between
i ts management efforts and community resources. In the
process of restructuring the delivery of its services, the
Author-ity became an active participant in the
prcess of linking services and commt..tnity resources to its
resident population. In light of BHA's evolving image as
housing for the working poor, facilitating educational and
emj:pfl. oyement services to its residents is not that di fferent
from many of its administrative or operati ng
responsi bi 1 i ties. Residents, however are the exc 1 usi ve
f c u..t
therefore, it is the resident= ofFor obviOUS reason=-,
p.bli c housing who have to guide the process of mak1::ing the
HU..thor i ty' s s upportive services program a viable endeavor.
As is the case of any service oriented effort, the process
of coordinating the delivery of services to public housing
residents has not been easy to structure. BHA's supportive
services efforts however are useful indicators of what
building blocks are necessary for the Authority to
successful lV assist its physical restoration efforts with
social revitalization.
In summary, the general approach of the Authority to in
efforts to reestablish its management capacity has been to
try strategies, such as decentralized management, which
incorporate "bottom up" inputs. The Authority is trying to
enhance the quality of resident participation in deci si on
making and increased operationalf and performance.
The strides which the Authority has made in addressing its
poor housing conditions have also depended upon attracting
huge sums of monies for capital repairs and improvements.
One last ingredient which the BHA has pursued with
dedication has been to improve the quality and quantity of
city services which are available to public housing
communities. Through developing neighborhood ties and
linkages to community services, the Authority has also led
efforts to improve the ability of individttals in pu.blic
housing to get an education, job training or employment
assistance in order to better pursue their goals.
CHFAPTER VIII
Rev iewing E's Managemet Performance
For the Boston Housing Authority, court receivership
has been an important period of institutional recovery. The
Receiver/Administrator's management reforms do not extend as
far as the need, but management capacity has been enhanced.
In moving towards a decentralized management system, what
did the Authoritv achieve and most importantly, how will
those efforts relate to the continued progress of the
Authority in fulfilling its housing mandates?
As the Authority prepares itself for the closure of
court receivership, there is real concern that appropri ate
measures be developed that can be used to safeguard the
progress which has begun. These measures will also serve the
system by affording it more lead time to design strategies
for improvi ng its housing performance. In addition to day to
day operating improvements, homes which have and continue to
1e affected by housing code violations will be relieved of
their shoddy conditions.
Performance Standards:
In general, there are two approaches to structuring
management performance standards for the purpose of
monitoring and improving the local management program. The
most agreed upon measures include vacancy turnaround t i me,
maintenance work order turnaround time, rent collection,
evidence of increased public safety and property security,
physical i mprovements, a decrease in wasteful t..utility
consumption and better financial and materials controls. In
some respects, improved record keeping is an implicit
performance standard as well.
These measures have quantitative values and are the
most common examples of improved housing conditions. In
contrast to quantitative measures of housing services, there
are less tangible, long term measures that unfold as other,
more quantitative efforts are achieved. The Authority, for
exa ample, has a management goal which is to decentralize the
delivery of its day to day services, and the configuration
of that structure has everything to do with the final
outcome, or quality, of the service. Strides in the
collective bargaining contracts for laborers, clerical
workers, craftspeople are ultimately measures of how well
the construct of decentralized managerial accountabi 1 i ty
will work.
There are numerous other examples of less measureable
performance standards which residents and staff alike share.
The most compel1ing example is the total elimination of the
A uthority' s housing code violations. Their Living Uni t
Inspection Program is an initial start; there are financial
and coordination problems that must be addressed before a
broad based, improvement program can begin. It is time for
the Authority to prepare an occupied un its improvements
pol i cy because resident and a range of departmental inputs
are required.
Other manaqement objectives are akin to performance
indicators such as efforts to build neighborhood ties, and
the city's police, fire, transportation and trash
Services. (Better Boston schools will have dramatic impact
upon children who live in public housing; BPS's biggest
constituent group). Ending racial discrimination and
tensions are other objectives which the management program
has to address. Creating a sense of community, is perhaps
the most crucial indicator of the Authority's housing
qualities, but only a few basic elements of that process
rests in the hands of field managers and residents.
Ultimately, it is the blending, interacting and
occassional clashes between performance measures that will
illustrate the capacity and stability of the Authority's
management skills. Reoccupancy goals must reflect Fair
Housing Subplans; preferential treatment of the working poor
calis for rigorous enforcement of the Authority's tenant
empl.oyment policy; and its scarce Supportive services must
be efficiently provided.
Quantitative performance standards have been widely\
adopted by the Authority and measures of their management
performance using these indicators lend potent support to
the progress which the BHA has made over these past four
years. Basic housing functions are linked to these standards
of performance and as such, they are critical base l ine
references from which to build more responsive, qualitative
management services from.
The BHA has identified for itself the following goals
which are reasonable and achievable objectives. Both the
to improve
plaintiffs and the citv-wide resident organi zation are i. n
agreement that these goals must be met. There is, however,
the need to be ciutious and not interchange goals with
performance quality. In addition, there is the woeful
influence of time and money, of which there alsways seems to
be either too much of one and not enough of the other.
BHA Performance Goals:
If the BHA adheres to its current goals, which
residents through their newly formed citywide organization,
have endorsed, it will continue to build upon the progress
of court receivership by increasing occupancy, (by 399 units
in 1984) and maintaining a high level of rent collection,
(95%. by December 1984); by improving maintenance through
workorder inspections, (101 of all workorders performed),
and by inspecting 100% of its units, (11,500 occupied units
by December 1984), to determine living and vacant Unit
conditions.
A commitment to continue to seek:: funds for substantial
repairs and sufficient operating income will require
qualitative and aggressive performance from central office
employees, otherwise the long term future and expanded
development functions of the Authority will never reach
fruition. In short, the present goals which the Authority
has set for itself, seem enlightened and attainable. That
opti mi si, however, can easily pale in the light of its long
joturney to full recovery., which has just bare ly begqun..
Major Findings:
In the short space of a report, (albeit lengthy), i.t is
not possible to adequately address the overall achi evements
and remaining tasks which the Authority has before it. There
are, however, some major areas of concern and accomplishment
which deserve attention in looking at the overall management
performance of the Authority during receivership:
**The ongoing effort to restore the physical and social
character of BHA's family developments has reaped
signficiant results. Family developments which have received
buildings, apartments and grounds improvements have seen a
visible resurgence in community optimism. There remains,
however a serious gap between improvements which are
en .joyed by long time public housing residents and newcomers.
An equal inequity exists between developments where little,
if any physical restoration has occurred and the need
exi. sts.
In both examples, the Authority must fashion a process
of allocation that links management with capital repairs,
including the establishment of a policy or program to
service occupied t..tnits. The Living Unit Inspection Program
is one concrete example of such an effort. virturally none.
** While there remains a degree of uncertainty about
how, and what role, residents will play in the decentralized
mana gement model, there is sLfficient evidence to support
= uch a management context. From the perspective of most
management and administrative supervisors, there is enhanced
field management capacity. The moti vati on of managment
personnel and the supports from central office have made the
be in ef i ts of ocal managemeint re+ orms f easi bI e.
** One important accomplishment of the BHA has been its
improved managment information system which has been
relatively reliable in providing the BHA with base line data
on its managment systems. This base will be broadened with
the Living Unit Inspection program and will, wit h the
potentially improved work order system, aid the Authority in
efforts to systematically identify and eliminate its
remaining housing code violations.
**The supportive relationship between field and central
operations continues to function properly; managers feel
more professional respect and recognition for the local
contri buti ons and headaches but efforts to build supports
between managers themselves has been fragmented.
The union status of the entire office staff, ex..cluding
laborers, may need to be openly assessed in order to compare
opt ions. The role of the Housing Manager goes beyond the
occupational constraints of a job description and local
dec:i si on-making a Uttonomy must be treated as a l onj term
priority.
**There are serious policy questions yet to be resolved
about the tenant selection program, occupied unit repairs,
tenant employment practices, fair housing plans and or lack
of plans and more attention should be directed towards
establishing a new lease for postreceivership uses. The
lease, in and of itself, will serve as a weathervane for
tenants to determine what benefits they have derived from
court receivership.
**Much of the social and physical progress associated
wi th receivership has occurred in peaks and valleys over
time. The Authority has to prepare a comprehensive approach,
an outlook, if need be, to systematically guide its social
and physical development.
Of the major accomplishments of court receivership, it,
is the stablization of its family developments which has
created the opportunity for mana gers BHA staf f and
residents to chart a different course for its public housing
communities. The hard work has really just begun.
Now in the midst of moving beyond the crisis management
stage of servicing its housing communities, the BHA has to
not only restore its vacant units but also its occ upi ed
apartments and bui ldings. Polici es must enhance the well
being BHA communities and properties, assist the maximum
nt..tmber of eliqible low-rent housing resi dents, increase
pol. i ti cal accountability to public housing fami. ies. The
iAuthori ty must be sensitive to the needs of long time public
hot..using residents.
Resi dents must share in the process of revi tal i zat i on
but the BHA must bear the major burden for e.s.tabli sh i ng
goals' and operating policies which bring all. BHA apartments
into compliance with the State's sanitary code.
CHAPTER I X
Look ing Towa2rds Post Receivership
Some Issues and Recommendations:
According to the declaration of court receivership, the
most essential task of the Receiver/Administrator was to
restore the Authority's ability to direct its operations and
resources in a manner that facilitates the long term
viabili.ty of the agency and the physical maintenance of its
properties. The court is also concerned that the BHA address
its racially segregated occupancy trends by promoting strong
desegregation and open housing efforts.
Public housing residents share these same concerns and
are especially interested in determining how assurances can
be established which restore and safeguard the sanitary.,
safe and decent conditions of their homes and communities.
There is support from the courts, BHA staff and off icials
for the long term goal of residents to futlly parti ci pate in
the political and institutional governance of the Authority.
O-ver the past twentyyears resi dents have been pushing
for reF- orms of all k i nds ran g i ng from tenant membership,
con1tr ol over BHA's Board of Governors to petitioning the
courts to remove the Authority from the auspices of city
hall. control . Al. l of these tactics have been aimed at
empowering public housing tenants with enough influence to
protect their homes and communities.
The present day configuration of BHA's management
Structure i s an important first step for reStori ng the
quality of housing services to residents. With decentralized
i nput into management operations, managers have been
empowered to direct day to day operations. The next step in
the overa 1l process of stabilizing the configuration of
local management programs is to prevent the return of
political patronage or sponsorship, once receivership is
ended .
In general, the post receivership goals of the court,
the BHA and public housing tenants are the same. It is to
establ ish a firm mechanism for sustaining efforts in
progress that have Upgraded the BHA' s basic servi ces. In
order to cont i nue as a housinI-Q resource for .lw income
peopLe, the Authority can not loose sight of its obligation
to the city's poorest and the homeless. Nor can EHA
employees be subj ect to the compromises of pol itical
patronage and insensitive political tampering by Governing
Board members or the mayor.
For managers, in particular, the responsiblity of
maintenance and management can not become subject to non-
professional influences. Without even completing the BHA's
Living Unit Inspection project, it is no secret that a major
effort is pending if the Authority is to bring its buildings
and units into compliance with the state's sanitation code
within the decade.
Neighborhood linkages and community services to public
housing developments continue to be fragile and in some
a r ea s, virtually non-ex:istent, despite the need. To date,
the Authority has barely moved beyond the skeletal stages of
ialting the widespread deterioration of its properties,
even in light of its successful vaca--incy rehab program. After
years of extreme neglect, many family developmentsa
still suffering from the blight.
In the next years, the Authority must not only bring
its family projects up to -full occupancy but also enter into
a solid partnership with residents amd their
organization(s).
With the physical renewal of buildings and apartments,
the predevelopment housing commun ity is often shaken out by
relocation./displacement forces, (even with carefully worded
guarantees, there has beem mixed results in every eligible
resident getting a new apartment.) Every effort must be
made to preserve public housing for its current resident
populace and to not shut out its poorest applicants. These
two goals are basic prerequisites for assuring that 1 ong
t i me BHA residents benefit from the Author i ty' s recent
g ains
By the same tokl:en, there are real concerns that relate
to the slow progress which the BHA has made in its racial
desegregation efforts; not unli ke those which have been
expressed about its Broad Income Range Policy. There are no
simple strategies for protecting the rights of all eligible
applicants of public housing, be they minority or fixed
income applicants. However, because public housing is such a
prominent force in the city's rental housing market, the
- uthority must weight its policy and administrative
mandates with serious regard for how those mandates may
impact the housing market, in general.
There are serious concerns about governance which, once
oAt of court receivership, the Authority can not ignore any
longer. BHA's statutory, governing structure, has inherent
pitfalls in its character. Political accountability must be
significantly enhanced, through electoral means or other
representative mechanism. If BHA's past experience is a
reason for caution, then there must be a strict separation
of Authority's administrative and policy ma.:ing body.
Tenant participation from the local development level
to the Board level is not a panacea for residents or their
organization(s). As members of the governing board, it is
difficult to maintain the necessary balance between
confrontational and collaberative options which tenants must
have to assure that their priorities are addressed. Without
a mai ori ty vote, residents as representatives of the
Governing Board may find themselves in the same boat that
former resident board members faced in that their influence
was relegated to a minority vote.
Rather than continue to list other, equally important
post receivership i.ssues of concern, perhaps this list of
concerns will illustrate the many tasks, both policy
oriented and operationally directed, which will have to be
addressed as the BHA prepares itself for the end of
receivership, be it next year or soon thereafter. The timing
of post receivership is less a factor than the conditons of
post receivership; clearly there are instittutional goal s and
.- '-.ictyv--s which deserve attenti~on cat this JUncture o+ BFIA's
rc.evitalization e+fortE
Cc-nc 1 usi on
The goals of receivership were to significantly realign
the Boston Housing Authority's organizational and political
character. Clearly, that process has begun and in the area
of field management the progress has been important for
restoring the confidence and capacity of Authority to
fulfill its mandate.
The work of physical and social rebuilding has just
begun; a blueprint for reprograming BHA's operations has
been drafted. Like any project of such magnitude, however,
the distance between the groundbreaking stage and the
completed structure is precarious, albeit exciting.
It is the finding of this report that the configuration
of a decentralized management program is a well conceived
arrangement for providing routine management services. There
is a general perception from managers and residents that the
wor st ccnsequences of BHA's former manaQement strategy have
been abated: patronage has been rejected, Structured systems
of information have been establ ished, perform ance and
accountability measures have been proposed, if not, fully
tested over time. An emphasize on the value of training and
staff support for field managers has emerged and seem to be
well received.
There continues to be a need for decentralized
management efforts to be more efficiently and strategically
linked with the centralized planning process. Project based
budgeting is a start, while central departmental supports
have, indeed, been supportive to the field effort. still.
there is a missing element between the field effort and
central planning efforts, some of more concern than others.
Again, the central role which money plays in upgrading
EHA's apartment and building conditions must be mentioned.
There are many, many code violations which have not been
even recorded, less more resolved, since receivership was
declared. Places that have been put into the redevelopment
pipe lines are like lux'ury condominums compared to many of
their non--redevelopment counterparts. It has al ways been
cl.kear that resources could never be allocated on the basis
of need only, nor priority, for that matter. Conditions of
financing, location and neighborhood, resident acti vi sm and
organization, were all factors in the actual allocation
Ir c- -e s s
If there is a super priority, it is getting the money
t f :i xup everv substandard hi-ausin cn ar ition The BHA1
sI-houl d continue to lean on its publ ic representativ. es fr
moderni zati on aid and voter regi strati on is a basic
necessity. It will require the balance of the near, qt.arter
of a billion dollar price tag that the Receiver spoke::e of, to
f in i sh the code violations alone. What about the
landscaping, parki. ng improvements, recreation and energy
i ip r czvem en t3
In conclusion, in lool.k:ing at the Authority'Cs management
system we found that with dedicated staff and tenant effort,
cou::1ed with major sources of f i nanci al assi stance and a new
approach to local f iel d management, the A..ithor- i ty has
managed to raise itself out of a sinking hole. The damage.,
physically and socially was enormous; perhaps incal cuable.
For the city of Boston, its public housing program has
represented a major portion of its rental stock and impacts
almost every neighborhood. The quality of city services that
are provided to public housing communities is an important
indicator of how well the Authority is doing to bridge its
isolation from the political mainstream.
The BHA must also continue its efforts to hold the
city's private institutions to their obligations to low
income communities, be it to provide jobs and educational
supports or other services to the Authority's elderly and
family projects.
In the future, the Authority must look towards the
continued resolution of i ssues such as building and
strenqthening its city-wide tenant organization and
e::panding its supply of family housing, (I thinkiI- an
abandoned housing initiative is a perfect point to start
from).
Finall, there can never be the return of the patronage
that divided the dedication of BHA's employees. When the
Authority has successfully eliminated its deplorable socil
conditions and massive numbers of housing code violations,
then the BHA can turn its full attention to regaining its
former image as a public institution that served its
residents wel. 1
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